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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST^TE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A, BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
and Cross-Respondentsf 
v. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANYr 
Defendant/Respondent 
and Cross-Appellantf 
and 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MARTf 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over thjLs appeal by virtue 
of the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated July 8, 1987, and 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING^ 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered pursuant to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Said order granted the respondent Western 
Suretyfs motion for relief from the judgment previously entered 
Case No: 870267-CA 
Priority 14(b) 
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by the court. The cross-appeal of Western Surety is in the 
alternative only, and appeals from that part of the final order 
and judgment that denies Western Surety's motion to stay 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's decision under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an abuse of its discretion? 
The following issues are presented by the cross-appeal 
and are contingent upon this court's disposition of the appeal. 
Should the court affirm the trial court's order granting relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) , cross-appellant Western Surety does not 
wish to disturb the order and judgment. Should the court reverse 
the trial court's order granting Rule 60(b) relief, Western 
Surety cross-appeals from that part of the order denying its 
motion to stay proceedings, raising the following issues: 
2. Was the denial of Western Surety's motion to stay 
proceedings error in light of the pending interpleader action? 
3. Was the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs error in light of the prior filing of the interpleader 
action? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ROLES 
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that: 
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may 
be joined as defendants and required to 
interplead when their claims are such that the 
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or 
multiple liability. It is not ground for 
objecting to the joinder that the claims of the 
several claimants or the titles on which their 
claims depend do not have a common origin or 
are not identical but are adverse to and 
independent of one another, or that the 
plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole 
or in part to any or all of the claimants. A 
defendant exposed to similar liability may 
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim 
or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule 
supplement and do not in any way lifait the 
joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraudf etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are justf the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order,or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides, in pertinent partf that: 
(a) Filing Appeal From Final Orders and 
Judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district court to the Supreme Court from all 
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the district court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Western Surety submits the following statement of the 
case as the appellants' statement of the case is misleading and 
inaccurate, and does not contain a statement of facts free of 
legal conclusions and argument. 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action involves a claim by George and Delia Baker 
(hereinafter "the Bakers") against a motor vehicle dealer, Craig 
Papa-Dakis dba Auto-Mart (hereinafter "dealer"), and a motor 
vehicle dealer's bond issued by Western Surety Company to the 
dealer. The motor vehicle dealer's bond provided that Western 
Surety would act as surety for the dealer and indemnify persons 
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for loss suffered by reason of the dealer1s fraud or violation of 
the Motor Vehicle Business Act if the dealer failed to so 
indemnify such persons. The total aggregate annual liability of 
the bond, regardless of the number of claimq, is limited to 
$20,000.00. (See bond, R. at 10f reproduced! at A-l.) The 
Bakers filed a complaint against the dealer and Western Surety 
alleging that the dealer had failed to provide clear and 
marketable title on a vehicle sold to them. (Complaint, R. at 
2.) 
At or near the time the Bakers filed their complaint, 
two other actions were filed against the dealer and Western 
Surety. (See certified copies of complaints, at A-25 and A-28.) 
In addition to the three lawsuits against the dealer and Western 
Surety, Western Surety was advised by the Motor Vehicle Business 
Administration for the State of Utah (hereinafter "Motor Vehicle 
Department") that thirty-five claims had been filed in its office 
against the dealer. (R. at 71.) Because the three lawsuits 
pending against the dealer and Western Surety and the other 
claims filed with the Motor Vehicle Department set forth claimed 
damages in excess of $100,000 (greatly in excess of the $20,000 
bond limit), Western Surety prepared to file an interpleader 
action pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
to join all of the claimants in one action, ^o as to avoid 
multiple liability and so that all claimants to the bond could be 
heard and treated fairly and equitably. (Se<| Motion to Stay 
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Proceedings, R. at 68.) A somewhat confusing course of 
proceedings followed due to the Bakers1 constant efforts to gain 
undue advantage and priority over the other bond claimants and 
thwart the interpleader proceedings. The following events took 
place even though the Bakers' counsel was advised that the bond 
funds would be interpleaded so that all claimants could be 
treated equitably. 
The interpleader action was filed and was assigned to 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on December 16f 1986. (See 
Complaint for Interpleader, R. at 90f certified copy reproduced 
at A-2.) Despite the filing of interpleaderf the Bakers sought 
summary judgment against Western Surety in the action below 
(which was before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson). Judge 
Wilkinson granted the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment and 
concurrently denied a motion brought by Western Surety to stay 
proceedings, which was based upon the filing of the interpleader. 
(Order and Summary Judgment dated 12/31/86, R. at 100.) 
With judgment granted in their favor, the Bakers 
attempted to frustrate the interpleader action further by 
garnishing every insurance agent in the State of Utah licensed to 
do Western Surety Business (R. at 110.) These garnishments took 
When the motion for relief from that judgment was heard on 
February 13, 1987, Judge Wilkinson indicated that he did not 
realize that interpleader had been filed at the time of the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, and that "in all 
probability [he] would have granted a stay there," if he had 
understood that interpleader had been filed. (Transcript of 
2/13/87 hearing, p.21, R. at 329, reproduced at A-50.) 
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place outside of the interpleader action where the bond funds 
were held for the protection and benefit of all claimants for a 
determination of distribution by the interpleader court. Western 
Surety, therefore, sought an order from the interpleader court 
requiring the Bakers to interplead and satisfy their judgment 
within the interpleader action. (See Motion to Enjoin Execution, 
reproduced at A-14.) Judge Moffat declined to rule on that issue 
in the interpleader action, stating that Jucjge Wilkinson would 
have to consider any motion regarding the judgment entered in 
favor of the Bakers. (See transcript of 2/5/87 hearing, 
reproduced at A-17 to 20.) Western Surety, therefore, brought a 
motion for relief from judgment before Judge Wilkinson. Upon 
reviewing the motion in light of the preceding circumstances, 
Judge Wilkinson granted relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and entered an order 
and judgment, which reinstated the Bakers1 summary judgment but 
required them to interplead to satisfy their claim and judgment. 
(Order dated 4/7/87, R. at 294, reproduced ^t A-21.) This appeal 
and cross-appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts. 
The somewhat confusing course of proceedings in this 
matter is best understood when examined in chronological 
sequence. As the facts in this case consist basically of the 
proceedings, the course of proceedings and statement of facts are 
set forth in strict chronological order below. 
1. On September 29, 1986, the Bakers filed a complaint 
against the dealer and Western Surety with regard to a motor 
vehicle transaction that took place between the Bakers and the 
dealer* The casef Civil No. C86-7427, was assigned to the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. (Complaint, R. at 2.) 
2. At or about the time the Bakers filed the complaint 
in this action, Western Surety was named in two other lawsuits 
involving the motor vehicle dealer's bond issued to the dealer. 
The first lawsuit was filed on or about September 22, 1986 by 
Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. in the Fifth Circuit Courtf in and 
for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utahf styled 
Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto-Mart 
and Western Surety Company, Civil No. 86-57954CV. The other 
lawsuit was filed by Safeway Credit Union One on or about October 
1/ 1986, in the Fifth Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt 
Lake County, Salt Lake Department, styled Safeway Credit Union 
One v. Robert Ockey, et al., Civil No. 86-CV-68912. (See 
certified copies of Complaints at A-25 and A-28.) 
3. On October 29, 1986, Western Surety, through its 
counsel, received notice from the Utah Motor Vehicle Business 
Administration that thirty-five complaints had been filed in its 
office against the dealer. (Letter and printout from 
Administration, Ex. A to Motion to Stay Proceedings, R. at 71.) 
Because of this notice and because the three pending lawsuits 
against the bond set forth claims exceeding the $20f000.00 bond 
limit, Western Surety took steps to obtain information on all of 
the claims filed with the Motor Vehicle Department, preparatory 
to filing an action in interpleader to join all of the bond 
claimants in one action, such that the multiple claims could be 
expeditiously resolved between the proper parties and such that 
multiple lawsuits could be avoided. (Motion to Stay Proceedings, 
R. at 68; affidavit of John N. Braithwaite, R. at 87, reproduced 
at A-ll.) 
4. Before the interpleader action was commenced, the 
Bakers filed a motion for summary judgment against Western Surety 
on its motor vehicle dealer's bond on December 5, 1986. (R. at 
43.) 
5. On December 9, 1986, Western Surety filed a motion 
to stay the proceedings in the action below based upon the ground 
that an interpleader action was necessary because numerous claims 
existed against the $20,000.00 bond, the total of which greatly 
exceeded the $20,000.00 bond limit. The motion to stay was 
further based upon the fact that the Bakers would be included in 
the interpleader action with the other bond claimants. (Motion 
to Stay Proceedings, R. at 68.) 
6. On December 16, 1986, Western Surety filed the 
interpleader action in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No* C86-9295. The case was assigned to the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat and is still ongoing. The Bakers were included in the 
action as bond claimants* (Affidavitf R. at 87; Complaint for 
Interpleader, R. at 90, reproduced at A-2.) 
7. Subsequent to the filing of the interpleader, a 
hearing was held on December 19f 1986 before Judge Wilkinson on 
the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment and on Western Surety's 
motion to stay proceedings in the action below. The motion to 
stay proceedings was denied and the Bakers' motion for summary 
judgment was granted. (Order and Summary Judgment dated 
12/31/86, R. at 100.) 
8. Pursuant to interpleader, the bond funds were 
deposited into the registry of the interpleader court (Civil No. 
C86-9295) on December 29, 1986. (See certified copy of Deposit 
and Order at A-34; receipt of S.L. County Clerk, reproduced at 
A-37.) 
9. On December 31, 1986, the order and summary judgment 
in favor of the Bakers was signed and entered by Judge Wilkinson. 
(R. at 100.) 
10. Although the bond funds were held in the registry of 
the court in interpleader, the Bakers sought satisfaction of 
their judgment by serving writs of garnishment upon numerous 
insurance agencies transacting business for Western Surety. 
See footnote 1. 
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execution attempts outside of interpleader, seeking an order 
These writs were served between January 14, 1987 and 
approximately January 27, 1987. (Garnishment affidavit, R. at 
117; writs of garnishment, R. at 112, 114, 119 through 152.) 
11. Because the execution attempts placed Western Surety 
at risk beyond the obligation of the bond and despite the 
pendency of interpleader, Western Surety filed a motion on 
January 16, 1987 in the interpleader action to enjoin the Bakers1 
requiring the Bakers to interplead to satisfy their judgment. 
The motion was scheduled to be heard on January 30, 1987. (See 
Motion to Enjoin Execution, reproduced at A-14; Amended notice of 
hearing, reproduced at A-38.) 
12. Despite the pending motion regarding satisfaction of 
the Bakers1 judgment, the Bakers continued to serve writs of 
garnishment frustrating insurance agencies transacting business 
for Western Surety. (R. at 119 through 152.) Because of this 
and because the execution attempts placed Western Surety at risk 
beyond the obligation of the bond, Western Surety sought and 
obtained an order on January 26, 1987 temporarily restraining the 
Bakers from executing on their judgment until the motion 
concerning satisfaction of that judgment coiild be heard. 
13. Pending the hearing on the motion before Judge 
Moffat in the interpleader action, Western Surety filed a notice 
of appeal on January 29, 1987 from that part of the December 31, 
1986 order denying its motion to stay proceedings. The grounds 
for the appeal were that Judge Wilkinson had erred by failing to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the interpleader, and by granting 
summary judgment in this action during the pendency of 
interpleader, which exposed Western Surety to multiple liability. 
It was Western Surety's position that the action should have been 
stayed since the interpleader action had been filed and the 
Bakers' claim was included in the interpleader. (R. at 153.) 
Contrary to the Bakers' assertion in its statement of facts that 
the notice of appeal was filed in response to a letter from the 
Utah State Insurance Commissioner , Western Surety filed its 
notice of appeal to perfect its right to appeal pursuant to the 
thirty (30) day requirement of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure on January 29, 1987. 
14. On February 5f 1987 , Judge Moffat heard and 
considered the motion to enjoin the Bakers' execution outside of 
interpleader. He denied the motion on the ground that any 
limitation upon the satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the 
Bakers would have to be set in place by Judge Wilkinson since he 
The letter referred to by the Bakers is appended hereto at 
A-41. A responsive letter written on behalf of Western Surety, 
is also appended hereto at A-43. A second letter from the 
Insurance Department that the Bakers have failed to direct the 
court's attention to is appended hereto at A-47. This second 
letter sets forth the Insurance Department's acknowledgment that 
the problem addressed by the Bakers was being resolved through 
the interpleader action. 
4
 The date of the hearing before Judge Moffat was changed from 
January 30, 1987 to February 5, 1987 to accommodate the Bakers' 
counsel. 
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had entered the judgment. In so doingf he dissolved the 
temporary restraining order and stated that he thought the order 
was wrongfully issued. Contrary to the Bakers' bald assertions 
that the TRO was improperly obtained in violation of numerous 
specific provisions (See appellant's brief, p. 5, n. 4), Judge 
Moffat did not set forth the specific reasons for vacating the 
TRO other than the fact that he did not believe he had 
jurisdiction over the judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson. (See 
transcript of 2/5/87 hearing, pp. 39-42, reproduced at A-17 to 
A-20.) 
15. Based upon Judge Moffat's ruling that he could not 
limit execution on the judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson, 
Western Surety brought the matter immediately to the attention of 
Judge Wilkinson by filing a motion for relief from judgment or, 
in the alternative, to limit execution to the interpleaded funds. 
This motion was filed on February 6, 1987 and was heard on 
February 13, 1987. (R. at 161.) 
16. Upon reviewing the memoranda and hearing the motion 
on February 13, 1987, Judge Wilkinson, after realizing that the 
interpleader action had been filed prior to his previous ruling, 
indicated that he would grant relief from judgment pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Transcript of 
2/13/87 hearing, pp. 19-24, R. at 329, reproduced at A-48 to 
A-53; reply memorandum, R.at 195.) 
17. Because Judge Wilkinson had corrected the error 
previously committed in the entry of the December 31, 1986 order 
and judgment, appellate review of that order and judgment would 
no longer be necessary as it was in essence moot. Western Surety 
therefore voluntarily dismissed its appeal from that order on 
March 26, 1987, pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, as dictated by Rule 37(a) when all issues on 
appeal are moot. (See certified copy of Stipulation for 
Dismissal and Order of Dismissalf reproduced at A-54 and A-57, 
respectively.) 
18. The case was remitted from the Utah Supreme Court 
back to the Third Judicial District Court on March 31, 1987. 
(Remittitur, R. at 292, 293, reproduced at A-59.) 
19. After resolving an objection to the proposed order 
and judgment, Judge Wilkinson entered the order granting Rule 
60(b) relief and the accompanying judgment on April 7, 1987. 
(Order and Judgmentf R. at 294, reproduced at A-21.) 
20. The Bakers filed their notice of appeal from the 
order granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on 
April 30, 1987. (R. at 300.) 
21. Western Surety filed its cross-appeal from the part 
of the order denying its motion to stay proceedings on May 12, 
1987. (R. at 304.) 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted relief from judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). Upon motion for relief from the December 
31, 1986 order, the trial judge recognized that the interpleader 
action had been filed prior to the hearing on the Bakers1 motion 
for summary judgment, and that interpleader jurisdiction had 
thereby been established over the bond funds. It was recognized 
that the prior order had undercut the purpose of interpleader and 
had thereby exposed Western Surety to multiple liability beyond 
its obligations on the bond, and had given tfhe Bakers inequitable 
advantage over the other bond claimants in the interpleader 
action. 
The trial court, in its discretion, saw a great need to 
grant relief from judgment and correct the error made in the 
entry of the previous order and judgment. Good grounds existed 
for relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1), 60(b)(5) and 
60(b)(7). Contrary to the Bakers1 argument, the relief granted 
was not a correction of a clerical error under Rule 60(a) where 
leave of the appellate court must be obtained if an appeal has 
been docketed. The motion was brought within the three month 
requirement of Rule 60(b) and was brought in accordance with the 
detailed requirements of that rule. The motion was timely and 
the trial court had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 
60(b). Relief from the judgment was expressly granted under Rule 
60(b). The trial court has broad discretion to grant such relief 
and should not be reversed unless this discretion was abused. 
The decision must be affirmed if it is sustainable on any ground. 
If it is determined that the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)f then this court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Western Surety's 
motion to stay proceedings. The motion to stay proceedings was 
based on the fact that the interpleader action had been commenced 
and the Bakers were joined in that action. The trial court 
denied the motion to stay and granted the Bakers' motion for 
summary judgment. This destroyed the purpose of the equitable 
interpleader. The relief granted under Rule 60(b) remedied this 
problem. If the order under Rule 60(b) is reversed, however, the 
denial of the motion to stay proceedings must also be reversed, 
as it was that order that precipitated the later problems in the 
underlying action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING UNDER RULE 60(b) 
SHOULD ONLY BE REVERSED IF THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, 
AND ITS DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IF IT IS 
SUSTAINABLE ON ANY LEGAL BASIS. 
The Bakers' appeal asserts that the trial court 
committed error in granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks a reversal of the 
court's ruling. The trial court, however, is endowed with 
considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a 
motion to relieve a party from a final judgment. Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 
(1973). Because of this broad discretion, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that it "will reverse the trial court [on Rule 60(b) 
decisions] only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly 
established." Id. See also Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 
1320 (Utah 1987). 
In reviewing a trial court's decision, an appellate 
court must also affirm the trial court if its decision is 
supportable on any legal ground. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm 
the trial court if we can do so on any proper 
ground even if the court below assigned an 
incorrect reason for its ruling. 
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). 
This rule of appellate review applies even if the proper ground 
was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if 
the proper ground is not urged on appeal. Qoodsel v. Department 
of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974); accord 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers, Assoc, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 
P.2d 290, 293, n.2 (1969). 
The circumstances of this case evidence the trial 
court's proper use of its discretion in granting Western Surety 
relief from the order and judgment entered on December 31, 1986. 
Numerous legal grounds exist for the trial court's ruling, 
including those indicated by the court from the bench. The 
arguments raised by the Bakers do not clearly establish an abuse 
of discretion, and the order and judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b) WAS 
PROPERLY GRANTED. 
A. The Motion For Relief From Judgment Was Properly and Timely 
Filed. 
The original order and judgment in this matter was 
entered by Judge Wilkinson on December 31, 1986. On February 6, 
1987, Western Surety filed a motion entitled Motion for Relief 
From Judgment or, in the alternative, to Limit Execution to the 
Interpleaded Funds. (The motion was filed after having 
previously filed a motion in the interpleader action on January 
16, 1987 regarding satisfaction of the Bakers judgment. Judge 
Moffat ruled on that motion on February 5, 1987, indicating that 
Judge Wilkinson would have to hear the matter because he had 
entered the judgment.) This motion, having been brought within 
thirty-seven days of the entry of judgment, was proper and timely 
under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) (set forth verbatim supra) provides 
that the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
the reasons set forth in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than three months after the judgment or order was entered. 
As the motion at issue was brought thirty-seven days after entry 
of the order and judgment, the timeliness thereof under any part 
of Rule 60(b) is obvious. 
The Bakers contend that Western Surety's "motion to 
amend" was untimely, citing Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This argument is completely misplaced. Western 
Surety's motion was not a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 59. 
(See Motion and reply memorandum, R. at 161, 195.) Moreover, the 
court's order was explicitly entered pursuant to Rule 60(b) and 
not Rule 59. (See Order and Judgment, R. at 294, reproduced at 
A-21.) 
The Bakers appear to be urging that all post-judgment 
motions, unless dealing only with the form of the judgment, must 
be made pursuant to Rule 59. This argument is groundless. Rule 
60(b) covers an array of problems that might arise or might 
become apparent after the entry of a judgment. It grants the 
trial judge wide latitude to deal with certain problems "in the 
furtherance of justice" at the trial court level where such 
problems can best be handled without resort to appeal. Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The argument that the 
motion is really a motion to amend raises nothing more than 
semantics and attempts to divest the trial court of the broad 
discretion it has to relieve a party from a judgment on any one 
of the numerous grounds set forth in Rule 60(b). 
B. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Grant Relief Under Rule 
60(b) and Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting Relief 
Pursuant Thereto as Numerous Grounds Support Its Decision. 
1. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Entertain a 
Motion Under Rule 60(b) and to Enter an Order Granting 
Relief Pursuant Thereto. 
The motion filed on February 6f 1987 sought relief from 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) or Rule 60 (a)f and, in the 
alternative, sought an order limiting execution to the bond funds 
held in interpleader. The court granted relief pursuant to Rule 
60(b). Contrary to the Bakers1 contentions, Western Surety does 
not claim that the court was acting under Rule 60(a). Indeed, 
the order entered on April 7, 1987 plainly states that "relief 
from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule 60(b).w (R. at 294.) 
The Bakers argue that the court lacked jurisdiction 
under Rule 60(a) because the appeal from the original order had 
been docketed in the appellate court and leave of the appellate 
court had not been obtained. This is correct according to Rule 
60(a), though entirely irrelevant to this appeal. Western Surety 
was fully aware of the requirements of Rule 60(a) in bringing its 
motion, as the motion sought relief under Rule 60(a) and 60(b). 
The day prior to the hearing on the motion, counsel for Western 
Surety called the Supreme Court clerk's office to check on the 
status of docketing and was informed that the appeal had not been 
docketed. (This information was later discovered to be erroneous 
or miscommunicated.) Western Surety did not learn that the 
appeal had been docketed until the time of the hearing when 
counsel for the Bakers represented that a telephone inquiry to 
-?n-
the Supreme Court that morning revealed that the appeal was 
docketed on February 11, 1987, two days before the hearing. (See 
transcript of 2/13/87 hearing, p. 20, R. at 329.) 
In light of this argument concerning the docketing of 
the appeal and the requirements for correction of clerical errors 
under Rule 60(a) when appeals are docketed, Judge Wilkinson 
indicated that he had a very serious question concerning his 
jurisdiction to rule. Nevertheless, he saw the extreme need to 
grant relief from judgment and, did so by exercising his 
discretion "in the furtherance of justice." The Bakers contend 
that he abused his discretion. Clearly, he did not. The 
fortuitous circumstance that the appeal was docketed two days 
prior to hearing is inapposite here; it being relevant only to an 
order under Rule 60(a). The requirement of Rule 60(a) that leave 
of the appellate court must be sought to correct clerical errors 
does not appear in and does not govern Rule 60(b). 
Clerical errors may be corrected at any time by the 
court under Rule 60(a), even on its own initiative. If an appeal 
is pending and is docketed, the appellate court obviously needs 
to be advised if clerical corrections are made to the order on 
appeal. Rule 60(b), on the other hand, governs something 
entirely different from clerical errors and allows a specified 
time period for motions brought pursuant thereto. Rule 60(b) 
expressly allows relief from a judgment to be sought thereunder 
within three months from the entry of judgment. A motion under 
Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment and does 
not extend the time for appeal. See Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Thus, any appeal from the original order or judgment 
must be perfected within thirty days despite a pending or 
anticipated motion under Rule 60(b)5. If such relief could not 
be sought if an appeal were filed, the three month allowance 
would be hollow and effectively reduced to one month. 
Rule 60(b), however, does not require the trial court to 
seek leave of the appellate court to grant relief from its own 
judgment. The trial court is vested with discretion to grant 
relief from its own judgments if it sees fit. The reasons for 
this are readily seen. Obviously, if relief is denied, nothing 
is disturbed. If relief is granted, the original order appealed 
from is no longer a final and appealable order and the appeal 
will not go forward. 
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 Western Surety filed its appeal on January 29, 1987 from the 
order entered on December 31, 1986. The filing of the appeal at 
that time was necessitated by the thirty-day requirement of Rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Faced with the 
problem of being executed against on a judgment entered against 
it based on a motor vehicle dealer's bond, while that bond was 
the subject of an interpleader action that involved the Bakers1 
claim as well as the claims of other bond claimants, it was 
Western Surety's position that the proceedings before Judge 
Wilkinson should have been stayed pending proceedings in 
interpleader. Although its right to appeal was perfected, 
Western Surety attempted to have the matter resolved below so 
that the delay of an appeal would be unnecessary. (If the trial 
court corrects its own errors, it is simply unnecessary for the 
Supreme Court to make the correction.) 
Finally, it is important to point out that the Supreme 
Court remitted the case back to the district court prior to the 
entry of the April 7, 1987 order. Western Surety voluntarily 
dismissed its appeal from the December 31, 1986 order on March 
26, 1987 pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure* This was done because Judge Wilkinson, upon hearing 
the motion for relief from judgment on February 13, 1987, 
indicated that he would grant the motion, correcting the error at 
issue on appeal. Thus, the appeal was no longer necessary as the 
only issue on appeal was mooted. Western Surety accordingly 
filed a stipulation and motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 
37(b) as dictated by the latter part of Rule 37(a) when all 
issues on appeal are moot. The case was remitted from the Utah 
Supreme Court back to the Third Judicial District Court on March 
31, 1987. (Remittitur, R. at 292, reproduced at A-59.) The 
order granting relief from judgment was entered seven days later 
on April 7, 1987. (Order and Judgment, R. $t 294, reproduced at 
A-21.) Thus, the Supreme Court had no involvement with the case 
at the time the order was entered in any event. The Rule 60(b) 
motion was brought in accordance with the detailed requirements 
of that rule and the trial court properly entertained and granted 
the motion by order of April 7, 1987. 
2. Numerous Grounds Existed For Granting Relief 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and the Trial Court Did Not Abuse 
Its Discretion in Granting Such Relief. 
At or about the time the Bakers filed their complaint 
against Western Surety, two other lawsuits were filed against 
Western Surety also claiming rights to the bond funds. (See 
certified copies of Complaints at A-25 and A-28.) Additionally, 
Western Surety was advised by the Motor Vehicle Department that 
approximately thirty-five other claims had been filed against the 
bonded dealer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-3-18. (R. at 71.) 
Section 41-3-18 provides that a person who suffers damage by 
reason of fraud or other certain violations of the Motor Vehicle 
Code may "maintain an action for recovery against the dealer,... 
and the sureties upon their respective bonds." 
The motor vehicle dealerfs bond issued by Western Surety 
to the dealer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1) provides 
that Western Surety shall act as surety for the dealer pursuant 
to Section 41-3-16(1) and indemnify persons for loss suffered by 
reason of violation of the conditions contained therein (fraud 
and certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Code) if the dealer 
fails to so indemnify such persons, "in the total aggregate 
annual penal sum of Twenty Thousand and no/100 Dollars 
($20,000.00), as required by Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1)." (R. at 
10.) The bond is reproduced at A-l. 
Because multiple claims existed against the dealer and 
the bond, Western Surety was exposed to multiple liability. The 
sum of the claims in the three lawsuits exceeded the $20,000.00 
bond limit, while the sum of all claims received from the Motor 
Vehicle Department exceeded $100,000.00. Western Surety was 
therefore entitled, pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to require the claimants to interplead their 
claims against the bond. The Utah Supreme Court has explained 
the interpleader rule as follows: 
An action in interpleader is a proceeding in 
equity in which a person who has possession of 
money or property which may be owned or claimed 
by others seeks to rid himself of risk of 
liability, or possible multiple liability, by 
disclaiming his interest and submitting the 
matter of ownership for adjudicatipn by the 
court. 
Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980). 
While Western Surety was preparing to file an 
interpleader action to join all claimants in one action so that 
all claims could be equitably resolved, the Bakers filed a motion 
for summary judgment in the action below. This occurred despite 
the fact that counsel for the Bakers was advised that the 
interpleader action was being filed and that it would include the 
Bakers1 claim. Western Surety responded by filing a motion to 
stay the proceedings. This latter motion was based on the ground 
that an interpleader action, which would include the Bakers1 
claim, would be filed as soon as information on the numerous 
claims was received from the Motor Vehicle Department. (R. at 
68.) 
Western Surety filed the interpleader action on December 
16, 1986, naming all of the bond claimants known to it, including 
the Bakers. The action was assigned to Judge Moffat and Civil 
No. C86-9295. (R. at 90.) A certified copy of the complaint for 
interpleader is attached at A-2. Interpleader jurisdiction was 
thereby established. It is the well-established and universally 
accepted rule that interpleader jurisdiction is established under 
Rule 22 by the filing of the complaint for interpleader. 3A 
Moore's Federal Practice 1122.10, p.22-99. (This is contrary to 
federal statutory interpleader where deposit of the funds is 
necessary for jurisdiction.) 
In cases outside statutory interpleader, 
deposit is not a jurisdictional requisite to 
interpleader, although deposit is universally 
permitted and often required within the 
discretion of the court as a means of 
safeguarding the disputed fund and facilitating 
execution of judgment. 
Id. See also Percival Const. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, 
Inc., 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976). Utah's interpleader rule is 
identical to Rule 22(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Interpleader jurisdiction was therefore established when 
the complaint was filed on December 16, 1986 and the $20,000.00 
bond became the res of that action and was under the jurisdiction 
of the interpleader court. The fact that the actual bond funds 
were not deposited into the registry of the court until December 
29, 1986 is of no jurisdictional significance. It was tendered 
into court in any event before the entry of the order and 
judgment on December 31, 1986. (See clerk's receipt, reproduced 
at A-37; Deposit and Order, at A-34.) 
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The Bakers1 motion for suzopag-y ju^gpejit and Western 
Surety's motion to stay proceedings were kea^d on December 19f 
1986. Judge Wilkinson was advised by affidavit of counsel for 
Western Surety that the interpleader action h&d been commenced. 
(Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite, R-.--.sat:r8-7*-i Despite this fact, 
Judge Wilkinson denied the motion to* srta-y-ptoeeedings and granted 
the Bakers summary judgment. (It Jjsfetr he^ais^ apparent that 
Judge Wilkinson did not fully undejr.sfeaftd fch&bointerpleader had 
been filed. See footnote 1.) The order an<i judgment was entered 
on December 31, 1986. (R. at 100.) Xhe ^ntRE of that order and 
judgment placed Western Surety at ci-sk beyond its surety 
obligation on the bond, thereby ere-a-fei-na-the-very problem that 
interpleader was designed to avoidl A*©T"r multiple liability. 
Based upon the reasoning,pf_g,nfcety CQ«. of the Pacific v. 
Piver, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 197 C<fi« Rp%€* 531 (Cal. App. 
Dept. Super. Ct. 1983), and other cases mvo-fev^ng interpleader of 
bond funds, Western Surety moved the interpleader court to enjoin 
execution upon the judgment obtamea_Dy .cne twicers outside of the 
interpleader action, and for an^prder c£§gStfina the Bakers to 
interplead and satisfy their claim (now reduced to judgment) 
within the interpleader action. (See certitied copy of Motion to 
Enjoin Execution, at A-14.) 
The Piver case was directly on point. In that case, a 
surety filed a cross-complaint in interpleader after learning of 
multiple claims against a statutory contractors license bond. 
Before filing its cross-complaint for interpleaderf one of the 
claimants obtained a judgment against the surety and the 
principal in a separate action. Upon the surety's motion the 
trial court restrained all parties from instituting or further 
prosecuting any other proceeding which affected the rights and 
obligations of the parties to the interpleader action. The order 
included a restraint upon Shamrockf the claimant with the 
judgmentf from executing upon or enforcing that judgment. The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order and stated that: 
The circumstance that Shamrock's claim has been 
reduced to judgment does not preclude such 
restraint. 
* * * 
A restraint against enforcing a judgment, as 
here, may be essential to the protection of 
interpleader jurisdiction. [Citations omitted] 
Indeed, there may be situations in which the 
various claimants to particular property or a 
fund should be permitted to proceed to judgment 
in a proper forum of their choice, being 
restrained in the interpleader action only as 
to the enforcement of any judgment so obtained. 
That is the established practice under Rule 22, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire (1967) 386 U.S. 523, 
535, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 1206, 18 L.Ed.2d 270, 278; 
[further citations omitted]) As revised in 
1975, the California statute is in conformity 
with Rule 22. 
Id. at 532. Accord Board of Ed. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. 
App.3d 977, 159 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
Piver presented a situation identical to that before 
Judge Moffat. The Bakers had a judgment against Western Surety 
on the bond that was the subject matter of the interpleader 
action. They sought to enforce that judgment outside of 
interpleader, claiming priority by virtue of their judgment. If 
allowed to enforce their judgment outside of interpleaderr the 
purpose of interpleader would be destroyed and Western Surety 
would be subject to multiple judgments and potential liability 
beyond its obligations as a surety. Such would be contrary to 
the interpleader rule, the statute requiring the bond, and the 
bond itself. 
Another case with circumstances similar to the case at 
hand is Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Santa Monica Fin. Co., 
6 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). In that case, a bond 
claimant that had filed a separate action pifior to the filing of 
interpleader was enjoined from further pursuing that action and 
required to interplead. A synopsis of this case appears in the 
addendum at A-60. 
Judge Moffat denied the motion before him, however, on 
the ground that it should be handled by Judge Wilkinson, who had 
entered the judgment in the first instance. (See transcript of 
2/5/87 hearing, pp. 39-42, at A-17 to A-20.) The matter was then 
brought immediately to the attention of Judge Wilkinson. In 
considering the motion for relief from judgment, Judge Wilkinson 
granted relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) from the prior order and 
judgment entered by him on December 31, 1986. The relief granted 
was consistent with the equitable interpleader rule and the 
reasoning of Piver and Santa Monica. As will be demonstrated 
below, good grounds existed for relief from the prior judgment. 
First of allf Judge Wilkinson recognized that the 
judgment rendered against Western Surety was in connection with a 
motor vehicle dealerfs bond, which was governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§41-3-16(1) and the language of the bond itself. The statute 
provides that: 
Before a new or used motor vehicle dealer's 
license is issued the applicant shall file with 
the administrator a good and sufficient 
corporate surety bond in the amount of 
$20,000.00. The corporate surety shall be duly 
licensed to do business within the state. The 
bond shall be approved as to form by the 
attorney general, and conditioned that the 
applicant will conduct business as a dealer 
without fraud or fraudulent representation, and 
without violation of this chapter, and may be 
continuous in form. The total aggregate annual 
liability on the bond to all persons making 
claims may not exceed $20,000.00. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The bond itself similarly provides that: 
The total aggregate annual liability of this 
bond, regardless of the number of claims, may 
not exceed $20,000.00. 
(R. at 10, bond reproduced at A-l.) 
Upon hearing the 60(b) motion and being advised of the 
circumstances that had developed in this case since the entry of 
the December 31, 1986 order and judgment, Judge Wilkinson 
recognized that an error had been made. He then realized that 
interpleader had been filed prior to the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment and that the order and judgment had been 
entered in error. In his discretion, he corrected that error. 
Rule 60(b) allows such relief. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, interpreting the substantively similar Federal Rule 
60(b) , has allowed correction of judicial errors under Rule 
60(b)(1). See Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co., 621 
F.2d 1062f 1067 (10th Cir. 1980). This is particularly so when, 
as here, the error is recognized by the rendering judge and is 
the result of judicial oversight. Id. at 1067. 
The grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) include 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The 
circumstances that arose in this case following the entry of the 
December 31, 1986 order, warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Although judgment was entered in favor of the Bakers "against 
defendant Western Surety Company," Western Surety fully 
anticipated the Bakers to satisfy their judgment within the 
interpleader action since the bond was the res of the Bakers' 
claim and judgment against Western Surety and was the subject of 
the interpleader. 
When the Bakers attempted to garnish Western Surety 
assets, Western Surety asked the interpleader court to require 
the Bakers to interplead to satisfy their judgment. Although the 
motion was based on substantial case authority (Piver, Santa 
Monica, and cases cited therein), Judge Moffat did not feel like 
he could limit the judgment entered by another judge and he 
declined to limit the execution. At that point, it was obvious 
that either a mistake had been made with the entry of the order 
reflecting a judgment "against Western Surety," or it was error 
to have entered the judgment at all in view of the 
filing of interpleader. Judge Wilkinson expressly recognized 
this as a mistake in granting relief from the judgmentf stating 
n[i]f your judgment just says a blanket judgment against Western 
Surety, then I think that's incorrect." (Transcript of 2/13/87 
hearing, p.24, R. at 329.) Clearly, the rendering judge has 
discretion to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) from a mistake 
made in the preparation of an order. 
The Bakers argue that because the order was approved as 
to form, relief cannot be granted therefrom. Approval of the 
order as to form, however, does not in any way negate the fact 
that a mistake was made in the order, and it certainly does not 
negate inadvertence in preparation and approval of the order. 
Approval of the form of an order by counsel merely indicates 
counselfs belief that the order reflects the judge's ruling. 
Furthermore, the Bakers contradict themselves by so arguing. The 
Bakers argue, on the one hand, that the relief granted was 
substantive (see point I, part C, of Appellant's brief), and on 
the other hand, that the relief granted was with respect to the 
form of the order and that Western Surety could not complain, 
having approved the form. As pointed out in the argument, supra, 
relief under Rule 60(b) is not limited to either the form of an 
order or its substance. Rule 60(b) allows relief from orders and 
judgments for an array of problems, all within the rendering 
court's discretion. The relief granted may be one of form or 
substance. 
Grounds for relief from the previous order also existed 
under Rule 60(b)(5), which provides for relief when the judgment 
is void. There are three ways in which a judgment can be void. 
A judgment is void only if the court which 
rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a 
manner inconsistent with due process of law. 
Brimhall v. Mecham, 27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (1972). 
In the case below, the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the bond funds, as they had come within the jurisdiction of the 
interpleader court on December 16, 1986. As set forth in the 
argument, supra, interpleader jurisdiction is established when 
the complaint is filed. With the commencement of interpleader, 
the bond, and specifically the bond funds, became the res of 
interpleader and the interpleader court took jurisdiction over 
them. Thus, Judge Wilkinson lacked jurisdiction over the bond 
funds and, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to enter the type of 
judgment that was entered on December 31, 1986. 
Many cases state two requisites for a valid 
judgment, that the court: have jurisdiction 
over the subject matter; and jurisdiction over 
the parties (the crucial issue usually being 
jurisdiction over the defendant) that is needed 
for the type of judgment, i.e., in personam, 
quasi in rem, or in rem, that it renders. 
7 Moore's Federal Practice K6Q.25121, p.60-225. 
Because the claim against Western Surety was necessarily 
dependent upon the bond and Western Suretyfs liability was 
limited to the $20,000.00 bond funds, Judge Wilkinson lacked the 
quasi in rem jurisdiction necessary to enter a judgment against 
Western Surety. Rather, the judgment must be limited to the bond 
funds which are in interpleader. The judgment entered "against 
Western Surety" on December 31, 1986 was therefore void since 
Judge Wilkinson lacked the jurisdiction (quasi in rem) over 
Western Surety that was necessary to enter such a judgment. 
Judge Wilkinson granted relief from that void judgment and 
entered a judgment against the bond funds held in interpleader. 
The judgment of December 31, 1986 was void for a second 
reason. By entering the judgment after interpleader was 
commenced, Western Surety was exposed to multiple liability, and 
specifically liability in excess of its obligations as surety, 
undercutting the purpose of Rule 22 Interpleader. The Bakers 
properly should have been required to interplead to prove and 
satisfy their claim. The court therefore "acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process of law." Brimhall, at 526. 
Western Surety was entitled, by virtue of Rule 22 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to require the Bakers and all other 
persons having claim against the bond to interplead their claims. 
Due process of law was thwarted by the entry of the December 31, 
1986 judgment. The judgment was therefore void on that basis. 
Judge Wilkinson properly granted relief from that void judgment 
and entered a judgment in favor of the Bakers against the bond 
funds, effectively requiring them to interplead to satisfy their 
judgment. This new judgment is consistent with due process of 
law and consistent with legal precedent involving interpleader of 
bond funds. See Piver and Santa Monica. 
In addition to the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1) 
and 60(b)(5), relief from judgment was properly granted for 
reasons under Rule 60(b)(7). Rule 60(b)(7) grants a trial court 
wide discretion to grant relief from an order or judgment for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Judge Wilkinson recognized the problem that had 
developed with the entry of the December 31, 1986 judgment. He 
recognized that it exposed Western Surety to multiple liability 
and undercut the purpose of interpleader, while granting undue 
advantage to the Bakers over the other bond claimants. (See 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Glassell-Taylor & Robinson, 156 F.2d 
519, 523 (5th Cir. 1946), where it was stated that one purpose of 
interpleader is to prevent a race to the swift and provide 
equitable consideration of multiple claims.) Relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) was therefore justified. As set 
forth in Point I of the argument, the trial judge has wide 
discretion in granting relief from judgment, and his decision 
must be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal basis, even if 
the trial judge assigned an incorrect reason for his ruling and 
did not consider the appropriate ground. Allphin Realty, at 861. 
Judge Wilkinson did not abuse his discretion in granting relief 
from judgment, and his order and judgment of April 7, 1987 should 
be affirmed* 
POINT III 
THE BAKERS1 CONTENTION THAT NO GROUNDS EXISTED 
FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b) AND THAT NO GROUNDS 
EXISTED FOR LIMITING THEIR JUDGMENT TO THE 
INTERPLEADED FUNDS IS BASED ON A 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF WESTERN SURETY'S OBLIGATION 
ON THE BOND AND A MINUNDERSTANDING OF INTERPLEADER. 
Western Surety's obligation as a surety arises by virtue 
of its bond. The obligation of the bond is expressly limited to 
an aggregate of $20,000 on an annual basis, regardless of the 
number of claims. The Bakers suggest that this limitation is 
debatable under the case of Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, Inc. v. 
Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557 (Utah 1983). To the contrary, the 
limitation is recognized by Dillon Oldsmobile to be in accordance 
with the statute. 
In Dillon Oldsmobile, the court examined two motor 
vehicle dealer's bonds issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§41-3-16. Although the language of the two bonds was identical, 
they had been treated separately by two trial courts below and 
had been interpreted differently. One of the trial courts had 
ruled that there was no aggregate limitation on the surety's 
liability on the bond and the other trial court had ruled to the 
contrary. The cases were consolidated for appeal. The Supreme 
Court identified the determinative issue to be whether the 
language of the bonds was more comprehensive with respect to the 
surety's liability than is required by Section 41-3-16(1). The 
bonds in Dillon Oldsmobile provided that the surety was bound 
"to idemnify any and all persons, firms and 
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of 
violation of the conditions hereafter 
contained, in the penal sum of Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($20,000.00). . . for the payment of 
which, well and truly to be made, ye bind 
ourselves. . . . " [Emphasis original.] 
Id. at 559. 
After examining this language and the statute itself, 
the court held: 
By the literal language of the bonds, the 
sureties rendered themselves liable up to a 
maximum of $20,000.00 for any loss suffered by 
any and all persons. [Emphasis original*] 
Id. at 561. The court further held that where the terms of the 
bond are more comprehensive than required by statute, the surety 
is bound by the language of the bond. 
The bond issued by Western Surety in this case is 
entirely different from the bonds in Dillon Oldsmobile. The bond 
in the instant matter is limited to a total aggregate annual 
liability of $20,000.00. This limitation is in accordance with 
Section 41-3-16(1) and is in accordance with the statutory 
requirement recognized by Dillon Oldsmobile . Id. at 561. It is 
b
 It must also be noted that the Utah Legislature amended 
§41-3-16(1) and §41-3-18 in 1983. The amendments to these two 
sections made it clear that "the total aggregate annual liability 
on the bond to all persons making claims may not exceed 
$20,000.00." The amendments also enacted specific limitation 
periods, requiring claims to be filed with the administrator 
within one year after the cause of action arises. 
a well established rule of law that a surety may only be held for 
the amount stipulated in the bond. See Western Surety Co. v. 
Childers, 372 P.2d 214f 215 (Okla. 1962). The judgment in this 
case was, therefore, properly limited to the bond funds held in 
interpleader as Western Suretyfs only obligation arises by reason 
of the bond and the bond funds were under the jurisdiction of 
interpleader. 
The Bakers contend that the bond is nothing more than a 
contract and that Western Surety breached its obligation on the 
contract by failing to pay the Bakers once judgment had been 
entered against the dealer and once summary judgment was entered 
against Western Surety on December 31, 1986. This contention is 
apparently based on a misunderstanding of the bond itself, as well 
as a misunderstanding of the consequence of the filing of the 
interpleader and the basis of Judge Wilkinson's order granting 
relief from judgment. 
First of all, the Bakers misunderstand the obligation of 
Western Surety on the bond. The judgment entered against the 
dealer was a default judgment. The Bakers plainly misread the 
bond in asserting that Western Surety was obligated to pay all 
judgments rendered against the dealer. With respect to judgments 
against the dealer, the bond provides that if the principal [the 
dealer] indemnifies persons for loss suffered by reason of fraud, 
violations of the motor vehicle business act and certain other 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles, and pays judgments 
adjudged against him on account of fraud or violation of the 
designated laws respecting motor vehicles, then the surety's 
obligation is null and void. (See bond, R. at 10, reproduced at 
A-l.) 
By the plain wording of the bond, Western Surety is only 
obligated to indemnify persons for loss suffered by reason of 
fraud and violation of the Motor Vehicle Code and other laws 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles, and is only so obligated 
as a surety. That is, Western Surety's obligation does not arise 
unless the dealer fails to indemnify persons for the identified 
losses. Western Surety is certainly not obligated on its bond 
for all judgments entered against the dealer. Ordinary money 
judgments against the dealer, which do not involve fraud or a 
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code do not raise an obligation 
under the bond. The bond is statutorily required for the 
specific reasons detailed in Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1). 
The default judgment entered against the dealer did not 
establish fraud or a violation of the motor vehicle code. It is 
a generally accepted rule that a default judgment against one 
defendant is not binding on another defendant and does not 
establish facts against the answering defendant. See, Clugston 
v. Moore, 655 P.2d 29, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). 
The Bakers1 contention that Western Surety agreed to pay 
attorney's fees in cases successfully prosecuted to judgment 
furthers their misreading of the bond. The bond provides that 
"said bounden principal" shall pay reasonable attorney's fees in 
cases successfully prosecuted to judgment. 
The second error with the Bakers' contention that 
Western Surety has breached its obligation on the bond deals with 
a misunderstanding of interpleader. The interpleader action was 
commenced on December 16, 1986, before the hearing on the Bakers' 
motion for summary judgment and fifteen days prior to the entry 
of the order granting the Bakers summary judgment. As indicated 
in the argument, supra, interpleader jurisdiction was established 
by the filing of the complaint. At that time, the bond became 
the res of interpleader and was under the jurisdiction of the 
interpleader court. Thus, the entire obligation of Western 
Surety on its bond became the subject of interpleader. This is 
dictated by the bond itself and by the statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§41-3-16. 
When the circumstances following entry of the summary 
judgment were related to Judge Wilkinson by the motion for relief 
from judgment, he recognized his previous error and the existence 
of jurisdiction in the interpleader court. Upon hearing the 
motion, Judge Wilkinson stated that if he had understood that the 
interpleader action was filed at the time of hearing the Bakers' 
motion for summary judgment and Western Surety's motion to stay 
proceedings, "in all probability [he] would have granted a stay 
there." (Transcript of 2/13/87 hearing, p. 21, R- at 329, 
reproduced at A-50.) Judge Wilkinson, therefore, corrected his 
previous error and granted relief from the prior judgment. He 
re-entered judgment in favor of the Bakers, but directed that 
satisfaction of that judgment was limited to the bond funds under 
the jurisdiction of the interpleader court. Legal basis for such 
a limitation had been shown in the strikingly similar Piver case 
and the Santa Monica case. Execution is limited to the bond 
funds because they became the jurisdiction of the interpleader 
court prior to the entry of judgment and because those funds are 
the extent of Western Suretyfs liability. 
The requirement that the Bakers interplead to satisfy 
their judgment is consistent with Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and due process of law. It is by the very 
authority cited by Western Surety that the Bakers are even 
entitled to have summary judgment entered in their favor outside 
of interpleader. See Pivery at 532. Indeed, with the filing of 
interpleader, Judge Wilkinson could have declined to enter 
judgment and required the Bakers to interplead to prove their 
claim in addition to satisfying it. It is Only by the procedure 
outlined in Piver that a bond claimant is able to obtain a 
judgment outside of interpleader once it is commenced. 
The cases cited by the Bakers concerning indefinite 
stays of execution are not applicable. There is no indefinite 
stay of execution in this case. Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen 
Brothers Construction, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982), held that the 
trial court in that case had erred by permanently staying 
execution of the judgment entered. Id. at 154. The court 
further stated that a party receiving a judgment is entitled to 
have that judgment enforced by the granting court. IcL The 
order and judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson on April 7, 1987 is 
not in conflict with Taylor National. Execution has not been 
permanently stayed in this action. In factf execution has not 
been stayed at all. Execution is merely directed to the 
interpleaded funds in accordance with Rule 22 interpleader. 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916), 
cited by the Bakers, is likewise inapposite. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS WAS 
ERROR IN LIGHT OF THE PENDING INTERPLEADER 
ACTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED OUTSIDE OF INTERPLEADER. 
Western Surety1s cross-appeal concerns only the denial 
of Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings and is in the 
alternative only, contingent upon this court's disposition of the 
Bakers' appeal. Western Surety believes that Judge Wilkinson 
properly granted Rule 60(b) relief in the furtherance of justice 
and that the new order and judgment entered on April 7, 1987 is 
consistent with the equity of interpleader and case law regarding 
interpleader of bond funds. Should this court affirm Judge 
Wilkinson's order granting relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), Western 
Surety does not wish to disturb the order and judgment. If this 
court, however, reverses the trial court's order, Western Surety 
contends that its motion to stay proceedings should have been 
granted in the first instance and, therefore, cross-appeals from 
that part of the order denying its motion to stay proceedings. 
As established in the argument, sufrra, interpleader 
jurisdiction was established on December 16, 1986. At that time, 
the bond funds were under the jurisdiction of the interpleader 
court. Neither Western Surety nor any bond claimant could 
dispose of or execute upon the funds absent an order from the 
interpleader court. These funds were deposited into the registry 
of the court on December 29, 1986, prior to the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the Bakers. Western Surety was entitled 
pursuant to Rule 22 to require all bond claimants to interplead 
their claims. The express purpose of Rule 22 is to avoid 
multiple liability. Hearing was held on Western Surety's motion 
to stay proceedings and the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment 
on December 19, 1986. The trial court was advised by affidavit 
of counsel for Western Surety that the interpleader had been 
commenced. For some reason, Judge Wilkinson failed to recognize 
this fact initially and he denied the motion to stay proceedings 
and granted the motion for summary judgment. He later 
acknowledged that had he fully understood that interpleader had 
been commenced he, in all probability, would have granted a stay. 
(See footnote 1.) 
The denial of the motion to stay proceedings was clear 
error. The granting of summary judgment undercut the purpose of 
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the interpleader by exposing Western Surety to multiple 
liability. The Bakers were included in the interpleader ation 
and should have been required to interplead their claim. 
The denial of the motion to stay proceedings was also error in 
that the court lacked the jurisdiction over Western Surety 
necessary to render the judgment entered on December 31, 1986. 7 
Moore's Federal Practice H60.25f2], p.60-225. The bond funds, 
which represented the extent of Western Surety's liability, were 
no longer at the disposal of Western Surety. The court had 
jurisdiction over those funds in interpleader. The trial court 
below lacked quasi in rem jurisdiction over Western Surety and 
should have granted a stay of proceedings and required the Bakers 
to interplead to prove their claim. 
POINT II 
WESTERN SURETY'S CROSS-APPEAL WAS TIMELY AND 
PROPER UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES. 
The Bakers contend that Western Surety's cross-appeal 
was untimely and is barred by the prior dismissal of the appeal 
from the December 31f 1986 order. These contentions are without 
merit, as they fail to consider the nature of the orders entered 
by the court below. 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that an appeal may be taken from all "final orders and 
judgments." The advisory committee note to Rule 3(a) indicates 
that the rule retains the "final judgment rule" of the prior 
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appellate rule in Rule 72(a). On January 29, 1987, Western 
Surety appealed from part of the order and judgment entered on 
December 31, 1986f pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This was necessary for the perfection of 
Western Surety's right to appeal, despite a pending motion in the 
interpleader court seeking to require the Bakers to interplead to 
satisfy their judgment. As entered, the order and judgment of 
December 31, 1986 ended the litigation and left no claim 
remaining for resolution. It was therefore a final order and 
judgment. 
Although its right to appeal was perfected by the filing 
of the notice of appeal on January 29, 1987, Western Surety 
attempted to have the matter resolved below so that the delay of 
an appeal would be unnecessary. Judge Wilkinson resolved the 
matter by granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The order granting relief from 
judgment and the new judgment was entered on April 7,1987. At 
that point, the December 31, 1986 order and judgment ceased to be 
a viable, final and appealable order. Relief from that judgment 
had been granted and a new order and judgment was entered. 
Accordingly, no appeal could lie from the order entered on 
December 31, 1986. 
Because appellate review would no longer be necessary 
and because the issues involved with Western Surety's appeal of 
the December 31, 1986 order were mooted, Western Surety 
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voluntarily dismissed its appeal from that order by filing a 
stipulation for dismissal pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure as dictated by Rule 37(a) when all 
issues in the appeal are mooted. (Stipulation for dismissal, 
reproduced at A-54.) By order of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah, the appeal from the December 31, 1986 order was 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 37(b). (Order of dismissal, reproduced 
at A-57.) 
The order granting relief from judgment and the new 
judgment was entered by the court below on April 7, 1987. The 
December 31, 1986 order and judgment was, therefore, no longer a 
viable order and judgment. Furthermore, Western Surety's appeal 
from that order had become moot. Contrary to the Bakers 
contentions, Western Suretyfs cross-appeal of the denial of its 
motion to stay proceedings runs from the date of the final order 
entered on April 7, 1987, rather than from the prior order. This 
is explained by the authors of a well accepted work on Federal 
Practice and Procedure, as follows: 
An application for relief from a judgment under 
Rule 60(b) also does not extend the time for 
taking an appeal. Even if the court hears and 
denies the motion before the appeal time would 
have run, the appeal must be taken within the 
prior period measured from the date of the 
judgment, not from the denial of the motion. 
If, however, the court grants the motion and 
enters a new judgment, the time for appeal will 
date from the entry of that judgment. [Emphasis 
added.] 
11 C> Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §2871 
(1973). 
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The contention that the appeal is untimelyf and that 
such would be obvious if the court had entered two separate 
orders on separate pieces of paper on December 31, 1986, is 
without merit. The order denying Western Surety's motion to stay 
proceedings, standing alone, was not a final order. Said order 
did not end the litigation. See Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631 
(Utah 1987). The order denying the motion to stay is only 
appealable if, and when, a final order or judgment has been 
entered. The final order and judgment was entered on April 7, 
1987. The order and judgment of December 31, 1986 is no longer 
viable and is no longer appealable as it is not a final order and 
judgment in this case. The Bakers filed their notice of appeal 
from the April 7, 1987 order on April 30, 1987. Western Surety 
filed its cross-appeal from the part of the order denying its 
motion to stay proceedings on May 12, 1987, twelve days after the 
Bakers1 notice of appeal. Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provides that: 
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of 
appeal within 14 days after the date on which 
the first notice of appeal was filed or within 
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) 
of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
The notice of cross-appeal was timely filed within the above 
rule. 
The fallacy of the Bakers1 contention that Western 
Surety's cross-appeal is barred by its prior dismissal of the 
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appeal from the earlier order, and that its cross-appeal from the 
order denying its motion to stay proceedings runs from December 
31, 1986, is obvious if one merely considers the ramifications of 
their contentions. If the Bakers1 argument is correct, and it is 
assumed, arguendo, that the December 31, 1986 order remained a 
viable, final and appealable order, Western Surety should have 
allowed its appeal to remain pending despite the fact that it was 
mooted. The Bakers1 argument would require a moot appeal to 
remain pending until it is determined whether or not the new 
order and judgment (which is the final and appealable order) will 
be appealed from. The problems inherent in such a procedure are 
obvious and the continuation of an appeal that is moot is 
completely inconsistent with the rules governing appellate 
procedure. There cannot be two separate dates from which an 
appeal runs. There is only one final and appealable order and 
all appeals must run from that date. The final order in this 
case was entered on April 7, 1987. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the trial court's order of April 
7, 1987 granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). The 
motion was brought and considered in accordance with the detailed 
requirements of that rule and the court, in the furtherance of 
justice, saw fit to grant such relief. The ruling was based on 
the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b) and was rendered in the 
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exercise of the court's sound discretion, which should not be 
overturned absent clear evidence of an abuse of that discretion. 
Should this court find technical error in the trial 
court's decision or find technical error with the trial court's 
jurisdiction to entertain and grant the motion for relief under 
Rule 60(b), the matter should be remanded to the trial court so 
that any such technical deficiencies can be remedied and the Rule 
60(b) order can be re-considered and re-entered in the trial 
court's discretion. 
In the alternative, if this court reverses the trial 
court, Western Surety's cross-appeal should be reviewed and the 
order denying the motion to stay proceedings should be reversed. 
The proceedings below should have been stayed in the first 
instance since the Bakers1 claims were included in the 
interpleader action that had already been filed. If the order 
denying the stay is reversed and a stay of the proceedings below 
is ordered, the Bakers will be able to participate in the 
interpleader action as dictated by the equitable interpleader 
rule, along with the other bond claimants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,?£** day of October, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
N. BRAITHWAITE 
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BONO OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER, SALESMAN OR CRUSHER 
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That we, C r a i g A. P a o a - D a k i s Auto M a r t 
<;>,»«# Ar.rtr»«« 2 5 4 0 S o u t h M a i n S t r e e t
 r i f y S a l t Lake C i t y 
County of S a l t L a k e
 U t a ^ a s P n n a p a | a n d WESTERN SURETY COMPANY 
a Surety Company qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as Surety, are jointly and severally held and 
firmly bound to tfta people of the State of Utah to indemnify persona, firms and corporations for toss suffered by reason of 
violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the total aggregate annual penal sum of Twenty Thousand and 
Oollars ($20,000V.as required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16(1). (1953. as amended), lawful money of the United States fo? ° ' 
the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors ana 
assigns, jointly, severally and firmly by these presents. The total aggregate annual liability of this bond, regardless of the 
number of claims, may not exceed < 20 . 0 0 0 . 00 
THE CONOITION OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH. That. 
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has applied for a license to do business as a 
Motor v«Hiri« D e a l e r mtum the State of Utah, and that pursuant to the application, a license has 
been or is about to be issued. 
NOW. THEREFORE, if the above bounden principal shall obtain said license to do business as such 
Mnfnr vmhifia n g a f g r anrt shall well and truly observe and comply 
with ail requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIOING FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE 
'BUSINESS OF OEALJNG IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3. Title 41. Utah Code Ann. (1953. as amended). 
and indemnify persons, firms and corporations in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16(1). (1953, as amended), for toss 
suif9r9^ by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of said 
Motor Vehicle Business Act or any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles, or rule or regulation respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority and shall pay judgments and costs adjudged against said 
principal so as not to exceed a total aggregate annual liability of t 20 , 0 0 0 * 0 0 regardless of the number 
of claims on this bond on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of said laws, rules or 
regulations during the time of said license and all lawful renewals thereof, then the above obligation shall be null and void. 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Said bounden principal shall also pay reasonable attorney's fees in cases 
-successfully prosecuted to judgment. 
The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any liability already incurred or accrued 
hereunder and may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the principal and to the Motor Vehicle 
Business Administrator, provided., however, that no withdrawal shall be effective for any purpose until sixty days shall have 
elapsed from and after the receipt of such notice by the said administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall in 
anywise affect the liability of said surety arising out of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of 
said laws, rules or regulation by the principal hereunder pnor to the expiration of such penod of sixty days, regardless of 
whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced to judgment before the lapse of sixty days. 
Signed and sealed this * t h day of F e b r u a r y 19 JL6 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS AUTO HA&T / / /* 
ATTEST 7 / J B ' 
/ ^ . . « , - t u ?••••• - • • - : ; • • £ ; •
 M 0 . w 
/ Pnncspal 
^WESTERN SURETY COMPANY 
-C3 C C, urety c Attorneyi^-Fact 
Approved as to form l f ^ -- \ (\ \ \ \ " Y / T O f \ (v\ **• ^ c : - i<sjS*:* ~ u ~ 
Office of me Utan Attc 
MVBA-1 (ftov S-*4) 
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
i».otiOH»«H0iercu-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS, 
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICK-
GMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF 
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI, 
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT 
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC 
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL 
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and 
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and 
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST 
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG, 
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY 
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM, 
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and 
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS, 
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN, 
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER, 
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG 
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR., 
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF 
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and 
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON 
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE 
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS 
dba AUTO MART, and JOHN and 
JANE DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER, 
DECLARATORY RELIEF, 
INJUNCTION AND INDEMNITY 
civil N O ^ ?$%<; 
y Mil £ h<i<s=rMtti 
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Plaintiff, Western Surety Company (hereinafter "Western 
Surety"), pursuant to Rules 22 and 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-1 et seq.f 
alleges as a cause of action against the defendants as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Defendant Craig A, Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart 
(hereinafter "Auto Mart") operated a motor vehicle dealership in 
Salt Lake County, Utah at all times relevant herein. 
2. All other defendants (hereinafter "interpleader 
defendants"), including John and Jane Does 1 through 100, have 
purchased motor vehicles from defendant Auto Mart and/or sold 
motor vehicles to defendant Auto Mart, or have otherwise entered 
into transactions concerning motor vehicles with defendant Auto 
Mart. 
3. Western Surety is a surety company qualified and 
authorized to do business in the state of Utahf having its 
principal place of business in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. 
4. Western Surety issued Motor Vehicle Dealer Bond 
#58161261 to defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart, said 
bond having an effective date of February 4, 1986. A true and 
accurate copy of said bond is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
5. Said bond is issued pursuant to Section 41-3-16(1) 
A-3 
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!! and is governed by Section 41-3-16(1) and the terras and 
l i 
J conditions of the bond. 
li 
i; 6. The total aggregate annual liability of said bond to 
all persons making claims thereon is limited to $20,000. 
j I 7. The interpleader defendants are potential or actual 
claimants under the bond and have made claims or may be entitled 
] to make claims against defendant Auto Mart and against Western 
, Surety based on their motor vehicle transactions with defendant 
!; Auto Mart. 
, 8. By reason of the conflicting claims, actual or 
i 
potential, Western Surety is in great doubt as to which of the 
'i 
claimants is entitled to be paid and the amounts to be paid. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIOH 
(Interpleader) 
9. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by 
!} 
reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 8 set 
i 
forth above. 
10. The interpleader defendants represent conflicting 
claims against Western Surety's bond an<3 Western Surety is in 
great doubt as to which of the interpleader defendants is 
entitled to be paid and the amounts to be paid. 
11. Western Surety is, therefore, exposed to multiple 
liability and several lawsuits and is further exposed to numerous 
additional potential lawsuits. 
A-4 
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12. Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
II 
; Procedure, Western Surety is entitled to join all persons having 
, claims against it as defendants in this actionf requiring them to 
h 
interplead their claims in the instant action and litigate the 
amount of damages to which they are entitled. 
I 13. Western Surety hereby represents that it will 
i 
deposit the $20,000 aggregate annual limit of the bond in 
It 
question into the registry of this Court, or otherwise deposit 
\\ 
; the amount of $20,000 as ordered by the Courtf in order to 
i| 
satisfy its liability or potential liability to the interpleader 
defendants, and alleges that it will thereby be entitled to an 
|| 
order discharging it from any and all further liability on its 
II 
bond to any and all claimants. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunction) 
14. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by 
I reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 13 
set forth above. 
15. Defendant Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. has filed a 
! complaint with the Fifth Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake 
! County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, entitled Great Basin 
i GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Western Surety Company, et al., Civil No. 
86-57954CV, wherein defendant Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. seeks 
!| recovery against Western Surety's bond, which is the subject of 
i j 
this action. 
16. Defendants George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker have 
filed a complaint with the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entitled George H, Baker and 
Delia A. Baker v. Western Surety Company, et a L , Civil No. 
C86-7427, wherein defendants George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker 
seek recovery against Western Surety's bond which is the subject 
of this action. 
17. Defendant Safeway Credit Union One has filed a 
complaint with the Fifth Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt 
Lake County, Salt Lake Department, entitled Safeway Credit Union 
One v. Western Surety Company, et al., Civil No. 86-CV-68912, 
wherein defendant Safeway Credit Union One seeks recovery against 
Western Surety's bond, which is the subject of this action. 
18. The complaints filed by defendant Great Basin GMC 
Trucks, Inc., defendants George M. and Delia A. Baker, and 
defendant Safeway Credit Union One, in the absence of the claims 
or potential claims of the other interpleader defendants, subject 
Western Surety to multiple conflicting claims and prejudice the 
rights of the other claimants, and such actions should, 
therefore, be enjoined. 
19. All interpleader defendants should be enjoined from 
proceeding against Western Surety on its bond until all claimants 
are before the Court in the instant action. 
A-6 
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il THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
ij 
jl (Discharge) 
| 20. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by 
j reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 19 
!
 set forth aJbove„ 
21. Western Surety hereby represents that it will 
», deposit the $20,000 aggregate annual limit of the bond in 
M question into the registry of this Court, or otherwise deposit 
i the amount of $20,000 as ordered by the Court, in order to 
satisfy its liability or potential liability to the interpleader 
* i 
,j defendants, and alleges that it will thereby be entitled to an 
t I 
1
 order discharging it from any and all further liability on its 
bond to any and all claimants. 
11 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Indemnification) 
22. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by 
reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 21 
j set forth above. 
23. At or near the time the bond in question was issued 
by Western Surety, defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis signed an 
I indemnity agreement on behalf of himself and Craig A. Papa-Dafcis 
dba Auto Mart, whereby he agreed to indemnify western Surety from 
and against any liability, including costs and attorney's fees, 
that Western Surety might sustain by reason of said bond. A true 
A-7 
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and correct copy of the application for bond, which includes the 
; written indemnity, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
i [ 
24. By reason of the written indemnity agreement, 
!l 
; Western Surety is entitled to indemnity from defendant Craig A. 
j Papa-Dakis for all expenditures incurred by Western Surety by 
; reason of the claims made against this bond, including costs and 
attorneyfs fees incurred in undertaking the defense of claims 
•I 
; made against it, costs and attorney1s fees incurred in 
undertaking the prosecution of this action, and any and all other 
expenditures incurred by reason of said bond. 
i | 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Western Surety Company prays for 
i 
judgment against defendants and further prays that the Court 
li 
adjudge as follows: 
1. On the First Cause of Action against all 
interpleader defendants as follows: 
(a) That each of the interpleader defendants be 
required to interplead their claims and settle among themselves 
their rights to the bond amount. 
(b) That the Court direct Western Surety where and to 
whom to deposit its bond amount of $20,000, or any part thereof. 
(c) That Western Surety be discharged from all 
|| liability on its bond, except to the person whom the Court shall 
.adjudge entitled to custody of the bond amount of $20,000, or any 
part thereof. 
•|j A-8 
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(d) That Western Surety recover its costs and 
attorney's fees and that the same be deducted from the amount 
that the Court directs to be paid as prayed for in subparagraphs 
(b) and (c). 
(e) That the Court grant plaintiff its costsf 
attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear 
just. 
2. On the Second Cause of Action against all 
interpleader defendants as follows: 
(a) That each of the interpleader defendants be 
restrained from instituting or prosecuting any action against 
Western Surety to recover on the bond. 
(b) That the Court grant plaintiff its costs, 
attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear 
just. 
3. On the Third Cause of Action against all 
interpleader defendants as follows: 
(a) That Western Surety be discharged from any and all 
liability on its bond, except to the person whom the Court shall 
adjudge entitled to custody of the bond amount of $20,000, or any 
part thereof. 
(b) That the Court grant plaintiff its costs, 
attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear 
just* 
A-9 
4. On the Fourth Cause of Action against defendant 
Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart as follows: 
(a) For judgment in its favor and against defendant 
Craig A, Papa-Dakis for any and all losses, costs, charges, 
damages, counsel fees and expenses whatsoever and the sum of its 
bond or any part thereof as the Court directs Western Surety to 
pay, and all attorneyfs fees and expenses incurred by Western 
Surety in bringing this action and defending any other actions, 
and for interest at the highest legal rate. 
(b) That the Court grant plaintiff such other and 
further relief as may appear just. 
DATED this /£, ^~~ day of December, 1986. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
(MUn '/* w ^ i 6 ^ ^ 
JQHNN. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorneys for Western Surety Company 
Plaintiff's address: 
101 South Phillips Avenue 
Sioux Falls, SD 57192 
8/86-743M.1 
•• ^JS^f ^£&& ^ ^ * "i: 
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DONNr EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
HIED »M CLERK'S OFFICE 
SALT LAKE COUMH. UTAH 
Dec 17 4 07 PM '86 
H 0U0K HIHOLEY CJ.CRR 
. S.e.WSt.CCL'Rr 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE H. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John N. Braithwaite, being first duly sworn, upon oath, 
deposes and says that: 
1. I am the attorney of record for Western Surety 
Company in the above entitled action. 
2. On or about the 9th day of December, 1986, I, on 
behalf of Western Surety Company, filed a motion to stay this 
action based upon the ground that Western Surety Company intended 
A-ll Q87 
to file an interpleader action pursuant to Rule 22 of the Dtah 
Rules of Civil Proceduref which interpleader action would include 
the claim brought against Western Surety Company in this lawsuit. 
3. A complaint for interpleader has now been filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Civil No. C86-9295. A true and correct copy of 
said complaint for interpleader is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A." 
4. Said complaint for interpleader includes George M. 
Baker and Delia A. Baker as defendants and thereby includes the 
claim brought against Western Surety in this lawsuit. 
DATED this / 7 ^ day of Dzte/rth^ , 1986. 
HANSON, D0NN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
"' ^tfbtlfc 
JOHN N* BRAITHWAITE 
Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s 1*7 day of 
NOTARY gGBLlC ^ 
My Commission Expires: Residing""at Sou.mM-h-0. UhjdL 
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I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy i 
of the foregoing to be hand-delivered this /~?^ day of j 
Dea*J*y* 1986, to: | 
John D. Parken j 
Marcella L. Keck i 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 ! 
Salt Lake City, OT 84101 
and I further certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this /"? day 
r_&Z£zJj± (A*) , 1986, to: 
Craig A. Papa-Dakis 
1630 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
8/86-600D.11 
J/rfor f t Mitn&C/rWhfc 
A _ 1 3
 ^ ~ « 
-n 4 M * i « n • .-••• ' 
JAH 16 3 53 PH '81 
&»%%ga-0fitteM>fiJ 
2L ; :o T > •:.--*••* 
i FILM':? 
; John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
| HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
i A Professional Corporation 
! 650 Clark Learning Office Center 
I 175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
\ Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI/. ISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
—"v 
VS, 
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS, 
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICK-
GMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF 
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI, 
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT 
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC 
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL 
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and 
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and 
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST 
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG, 
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY 
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM, 
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and 
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS, 
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN, 
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER, 
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG 
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR., 
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF 
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and 
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON 
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE 
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS 
dba AUTO MART, JOHN and JANE 
DOES 1 through 100, and UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO ENJOIN 
EXECUTION AND 
DETERMINE PRIORITY 
TO BOND FUNDS 
Civil No. C86-9295 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
A-14 
Western Surety Company hereby moves the above entitled 
Court for an injunction, enjoining defendants George M. and Delia 
!i
 ! 
A. Baker from executing upon the judgment obtained against ! 
:! i 
.' Western Surety Company in the action styled George M. Baker and i 
:l i 
'• Delia A, Baker v. Western Surety Company; Craig A, Papa-Dakis, et j 
i al.. Civil No. C86-7427, and requiring defendants George M. and Delia 
i| 
;; A. Baker to interplead their claim to the bond funds in the 
instant action. 
Western Surety Company further moves this Court to 
determine priority to the bond funds held by the Court pursuant 
li 
, to this action for interpleader. 
ij 
DATED this /Cr- day of January, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH i 
/-tnr-
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i 
I hor^hy certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be HAND DELIVERED this /fcT^ day of 
j , 1987, to the following: 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, DT 84101 
<Z^^A}%^MA 
and 1 further certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
each of the named party defendants in this action on the / U^ 
day of v&nuarty • 1 98 ?. 
•f 
9/8€-74JM.8 
r&rf^Vfrngy* 
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I. T^« UWOERSiC^CD, CLERK 01= THE DISTRICT 
rc^RT dP BM.T LA:CE COUNTY, UTAH, CO HE3SBV 
* C ?-ii^! \TK,<\ THE AN'KSXED AND FCnC^ClNG 13 
I •^\'--kWD FULL COPY C? AW C ^ S ^ L CCCi> 
V*-."rtESS MY HAND > ^ D S E M i C? ^ AlD COURT 
w
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10 
11 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
1
 THE COURT: That should be resolved by Judge 
2
 Wilkinson now# not by me. 
* MR. BRAITHWAITE: The motion against Western 
4
 Surety upon the bond liability, pursuant to the statute, 
* 31-4-18, only upon the bond. 
6
 I THE COURT: That question I think, Mr. Braithwait^ 
you have got to approach with Judge Wilkinson. That's hi. s 
8
 law suit. He tried that case. You're asking me now to 
* J make a ruling about whether that judgment can be executed 
could be satisfied and that is not in this case. It proper4 
-ly shouldn't be a part of this case. That should be a part} 
'* | of the case with Judge Wilkinson;so I frankly think that to 
13
 I the extent—well, I frankly think the order was wrongfully 
,4
 issued and I am going to dissolve the temporary restraining 
15
 order. 
16
 J Now, that does not make any ruling and not intended 
to be a ruling as to whether or not the Baker judgment has 
priority against this fund;but I am not going to, in this 
19
 J action, stay the execution of that judgment and if they wantj 
to go try and execute anyplace they want to, such defenses 
as may be available to those executions can be raised;but 
they'll have to be raised in that case. 
** Now, if they execute against the fund here, that wili 
24
 clearly raise the question of the priority that we're driving 
** I at here. But everybody is entitled to be heard on that, not 
just the people who are here today. So that in the event tq 
execution is made as aginst the County Attorney's Office 
7 
8 
9 
' an objection could or should be! filed, And as to that,) 
2
 based upon the fact that that's a priority, that shouldn't 
* I be qx -inted ; In, wku ch event, we,l1 ] notice it up or somebody 
will notice it up and we!11 hear that issue totally and 
* completely, with everyone who "has been named in uie action 
6
 I to receive notice, because everybody's entitled to that. 
But In so far aa what is going on in that other case over 
there, J, ami not qoiruj to corit Inue the temporary t estra.Ln Lngj 
order and it's hereby dissolved. 
10
 MR. BRAITHJCVITE: Well, Your Honor, then our Motiop\ 
'" i to Enjoin Execiirmri I*IJM uti,'in n mirnrieii with «i Mot-ion LO 
11 Determine Priority. 
13
 I THE COURT: Not going to determine priority xn thils 
case here today. You haven*t even c^ ot all the parties here 
and you don't even have notice to all the parties or servicja 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: h i 1 f I m pa i !" 1 e s llhna ve r ece I, i/ecl 
notice, Your Honor. And Your Honor is quite correct, there) 
are eight of the parties that have not yet been served. 
THE COURT: I think aa tu M R questi on of priority) 
everybody who is in this action is entitled to be heard and) 
the action I have just taken is not going to allow Mr. 
Parken's cl Lents to g< ::> < )i it a. latch, on to that $20,000 
fund If they do that, you can raise the objection and filfc 
the very Tfcind of thing that we1re talking about A petition 
iio determine nr motion to determine priorities In this case 
I will, point, take that under advisement, but every-
-body is entitled to be heard;so everybody is entitled to bi 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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18 
19 
20 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
noticed as to that issue. That's still up in Hie 
air and going to stay up in the air until we have everybody! 
here who has an interest and we'll hear it. But as to the 
staying of the judgment and the Baker vesus Western Surety 
Company case, I dpn't think that I have any jurisdiction 
to stay that. Judge Wilkinson is the judge who heard it an£ 
he was asked to stay it and he refused to do it. If you 
want to go back and repetition him on that, you may. But 
I think until that's done, I haven't got any right to step 
in and tell them they can't do that. To protect the fund, 
if they execute against it and I haven't said they can't do! 
that and I haven't said I am going to allow them to get the| 
fund either. I am going to allow them whatever they think 
they can execute,on that judgment and you're going to have 
to get your relief from the Supreme Court or Judge Wilkinsoh. 
It's perfectly clear that it's improper for me to substitute 
my judgment for his. 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Under Your Honor's ruling,however, 
I think the case of Surety Company of the Pacific versus 
Piver is exadtly the situation we have here. This court 
does have the authority to enjoin the execution outside of 
the interpleader action. 
THE COURT: Well, I think may be I have, but I 
don't think I am going to tell that to Judge Wilkinson what) 
you've already asktd him to do and already turned it down. 
That would reverse him. I don't have any jurisdiction by 
41 
I have jurisdiction over in this case The question 
as to the effectiveness and extent of the judgment granted 
in the Baker case is real ly •Judge Wilkinson's, it isn't min^ 
If I substituted ray judgment for him, I would clearly be 
wrong cnat will be the order. You may prepare it, 
Mr. Paken. 
MR. PARKEN: Appreciate it, Your Honor. 
MR. LEWI Corn 1x1 w€i it:11 A date for a hearing, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You haven't got service on everybody 
yet a i i, ::! ta] k tc • Kathy about set I: i i i a 
date. My Law and Motion comes up every Friday. If we're 
going to have an extended hearing, we'll need a special 
setting. We can give that to you as soon as you know you 
have got everybody in the action you think you can get into 
the act :1 on If you wi 1 1 just • contact Kathy,we* 
date out. 
(WHEREUPON this hearing was concluded.) 
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
mi mr 
Deputy CterK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
' fek SL\3 Y\\a 313 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
The Motion of Western Surety Company For Relief From 
Judgment or, in the alternative, To Limit Execution to the 
Interpleaded Funds came on regularly for hearing before this 
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, on Friday, 
February 13, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Western Surety 
Company appearing by and through its counsel, John N. 
Braithwaite, plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel, 
John D. Parken, the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file 
A-21 
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herein, having reviewed the memoranda supporting and opposing 
said mo I ion, havinq heard mul considered the arguments and the 
representations of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HBRBBf ORDERED that the motion of Western Surety 
Company for relief from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of '",ivil Pr icetlu1 e tor Lht ieasun that 
the Order and Summary Judgment previously signed and entered by 
this Court on December 31, 1986 was entered by mistake and is 
incorrect, an-i £m the r, eas.Mi that said Order and Summary 
Judgment is otherwise void. Relief from judgment .; accordingly 
granted and the Order and Summar ; : .•*< .- .. -•
 t: rd is 
mod i f led ami corrected pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, so as to be entered in its entirety as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Western Surety Company's 
motion to stay proceedings is denied; and J i: r>« hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that no genuine dispute exists as to any 
fact material to the determination of plaintiffs1 motion for 
summary judgment and plaintiffs ace granted summary judgment 
against Western Surety Company's bond in the amount of 
$15,800,14, together with interest at the rate of twelve (12) per-
cent per annum from and after Decenibei' 1,1 1986,- and together 
with plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action, but with each 
A-22 
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party to bear their own counsel fees, and it is is hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment awarded to the 
plaintiffs is against the bond only, that the plaintiffs are only 
entitled to relief against the bond funds, which funds are 
deposited in the registry of the Court in the interpleader 
action, and that the plaintiffs' relief against the bond funds is 
limited as determined by the Court in the interpleader action 
filed on December 16, 1986, Civil No. C86-9295; and it is hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that Western Surety Company's liability 
is limited to the bond* 
DATED this 7 day of ^ ^ - ^ , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H.D.XONH.NOUEV 
he Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
aintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that- I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to be hand delivered this 
Hot day of /tf/Jr^L , 1987, to the following: 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, OT 84101 
9/86-600D.*, 
(LL //. 
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cRK Gf THE CiRCuil CGUFJ 
S A 7 LAKE GEPARTKcNT 
RICHARD C. CAHOON -#A535 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801)521-3800 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt La«e 
I, 
*  f s ft ra ) s * ^ . \ ttlSJl / -? { 
the undars.g-'--- Clerk of ^ P ^ a ^ S 6 0 ^ T ^ * i ' o-^ 
i, Salt Laka County, Salt Ukfc D | b t | ^ i f c F < # t e W Utah, 
certify tr*t toe annexed and forggi 
copy of an original document on file 
oterk. 
WHneai any hand and seal of said Court This ^3 
day of /CcC0«,^
 1 9 frQ 
PAUL L VANCE, Clerk 
By 
Deputy 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
GREAT BASIN GMC TRUCKS, INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CRAIG A. PAPADAKIS d/b/a 
AUTO MART and WESTERN 
SURETY COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 86-57954CV 
For cause of action, Plaintiff complains and alleges against 
Defendant as follows: 
Count I 
1. The amount in controversy herein is less than $10,000 
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1 exclusive of cost of court. 
2 2. The Defendant on June 28, 1986 fraudulently with an 
3 intent to defraud Plaintiff, issued a check for $8511.00 and took 
4 possession of a 1985 Chevrolet truck/ vehicle identification 
5 number 1GCEK14HIFF364925. 
6 I 3. Defendant owes the sum of $8,511.00 for a 1985 Chev-
' I i. o let truck, as shown on the statement attached hereto as Exhibit 
° jj "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
4. The Plaintiff's agreement for purchase of this auto-
mobile provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees, 
costs of collection and interest at the rate of 18% per annum, 
July, 28, 1986, unt i1 paid. 
5. The Defendant has issued a "bad check", a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", thus failing to pay the usm 
owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has give Defendant written notice 
as provided in Section 7-15-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
Count II 
6. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
c paragraphs 1-5 o Count I as if fully set forth 
herein. 
7. The Defendant Western Surety Company issued a bond 
2 
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pursuant to Section 41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
8. The Plaintiff pursuant to Section 41-3-16(a) has filed a 
claim in writing with the State Administrator. 
9. The Plaintiff has not been paid the sum of $8511.00 by 
either of the defendants. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands Judgment against the Defendant 
Craig A. Papadakis as follows on Count I: 
1. For the sum of $8511.00. 
2. Reasonable Attorney Fees. 
3. Interest and costs. 
4. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and equitable. 
On Count II against defendant Western Surety Company: 
1. For the sum of $8511.00. 
2. Interest and costs. 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just 
and equitable. 
DATED this /y day of September, 1986. 
TCrCHARD C. CAHOON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'^^K^ 
Plaintiff's Address: 
2800 South 300 West 
P.O. Box 15469 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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I, the u n d & r ^ ' r v ' v' ^ Circuit Cou t, 9fc*» e ' 
Utah, Salt Laka C o ^ w ;.V- i \ke Capartmon <jo '^raby 
certify the; the anr**^j r:>; ^xjoing is a t*ie :-nci 5^J 
copy of an origin*! documon; on file in my office as sucr 
dork. 
Wine* my hand a«d s'*" c-r said Court This S. • 
«*y of . „, ,.;*. • —,;,.,A 19 — 
PAUL L VANCE, Clerk 
%- _ _ _ ^ > l fv -;< 
Oepuiv 
Mark A. Wolfert - 4171 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 26786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84126-0786 
Telephone: (801) 972-0307 
3N VWv iTRClMT COURT K')P SAL/I1 LAKE <T)Urn 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, ST^TE OF UTAH 
SAFEWAY CREDIT UNION ONE 
formerly known as Safeway 
Credit Union, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERT OCKEY, CAROL OCKEY also 
known as Carol Fossat, and 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS dba Craig 
A, Papa-Dakis Auto Mart, 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Safeway Credit Union formerly known as 
Safeway Credit Union, alleges and complains of the Defendants as 
follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a credit union authorized to and doing 
business In Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendants RobeiL Cekey and Carol Ockey also known 
as Carol Fossat are residents of Salt L4ke county, Utah, 
3s< OT> 
-»:KK Cf 
C O M P • A > H T 
Civil Nc ^LZ^hllZJ}X/ 
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3. Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. 
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart is a resident of and doing business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
4. Defendant Western Surety Company is a surety company 
qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as a 
surety. 
5. The amount in controversy, exclusive of costs and 
interest, is less than $10,000.00. 
6. This cause of action arose in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
7. On or about September 5, 1985, Defendants Robert and 
Carol Ockey executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Safeway Credit 
Union Paymaster Promissory Note and Loan Agreement, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as 
Exhibit "A.n 
8. On or about September 5, 1985, said Defendants also 
executed a security agreement and financing statement whereby they 
pledged a 1982 Toyota Pickup Truck to the Plaintiff as collateral 
for the loan in Exhibit "A." A true and correct copy of the 
security agreement and financing statement is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B.w 
9. Plaintiff has a perfected first lien security 
interest in the 1982 Toyota Pickup Truck by way of the first lien 
notation on the Utah Certificate of Title, the original being in 
the hands of the Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of said title 
is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 
"C." 
10. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the note in 
Exhibit "A," Defendants Robert and Carol Ockey were to make 
regular monthly payments to Plaintiff, which they have failed to 
A-29 
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do; said Defendants are therefore in default under the terms and 
conditions of the agreements in Exhibits "A" and "B." 
11. Defendants owe to Plaintiff and Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover from Defendants the amount of $4585.14 plus 
interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum from a~* : 
after August 22, 1986. 
Plaintiff is also ent i tied to recover a reasonable 
attorneys fee from the Defendants pursuant to the agreement in 
Exhibit "A." 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 
through 12 of the First Cause of Action. 
14. Subsequent to Defendants Ockeysf loan agreement 
with Plaintiff in September, 1985, and subsequent to Defendant 
fcraig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart's bond dated 
February 4, 1986, Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. 
pPapa-Dakis Auto Mart came into possession of the 1982 Toyota 
pickup Truck. 
15. Defendants Ockeys had surrendered the vehicle to 
Defendant Craig A, Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart 
for the purpose of trading it in on a new vehicle. 
16. Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. 
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart was to tender the amount due on the 
Defendants Ockeys1 obligation with the Plaintiff to Plaintiff 
credit union, whi ch said Defendant has failed to do. 
J 7 Despite notice and demand to the contrary, 
Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart 
has failed and refused to return the vehicle to Plaintiff or 
Defendants Ockeys, and has also failed to pay to Plaintiff the 
amount of the underlying obligation. 
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18. Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. 
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart has also violated provisions of Title 41 
regarding the proper registration of vehicles with the Utah 
Department of Motor Vehicles. 
19. By virtue of said Defendant's conversion and 
violation of Title 41, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
$4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum from and after August 22, 1986 until paid, which amounts 
Plaintiff is entitled to collect from said Defendant. 
20. Plaintiff is also entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 
through 2 of the First and Second Causes of Action. 
22. On or about February 4, 1986, Defendant Western 
Surety Company executed and filed its bond of Motor Vehicle 
Dealer, Salesman or Crusher, Bond #58161261, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Exhibit "D.w 
23. Said bond proports to be executed and filed 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-3-16(1), (1953, as amended), 
promising to indemnify persons, firms c*nd corporations for loss 
suffered in the total aggregate annual penal sum of $20,000.00. 
24. Said bond also binds the said Defendant to pay 
reasonable attorney's fees in cases that are successfully 
prosecuted to judgment. 
25. Pursuant to §41-3-16(1) of the Utah Code, Plaintiff 
filed a written claim with the administrator within one year after 
this cause of action arose, a true and correct copy of which claim 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
- 4 -
26. Having not received an acceptable response to that 
claim, Plaintiff Is filing this action against Defendant Western 
Surety Company within two (2) years after the claim was filed, as 
required by said title, chapter and section. 
27. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of its 
damages from the Defendant on Defendant's bond in the amount of 
$4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum from and after August 22, 1986, uhtil the date paid, and its 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for j udgmen 1: aga i ns t the 
I)e£enda as follows: 
For damages against the Defendant s Robert and Carol 
Ockey a ] s< known as Carol Fossat in the amount of $4585.1 4 plus 
interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum from 
August 2?- 1QR6, until the date paid on Plaintiff's First Cause of 
Action; 
2. For damages against the Defendant Craig A. 
Papa-Dakis dba Craig fl Papa-Dakis Auto Mart i n the amount of 
$4585•14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum from August 22, 1986, until the date paid on Plaintiff's 
Second Cause of Action; 
3. For damages against Defendant Western Surety Company 
in the amount of $4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum from August 22, 1986, until the date paid 
on Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action; 
4. For reasonable attorneys ^ ees; 
5# p o r costs of court; and 
- 5 -
A-32 
6. For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED t h i.3t< day of September, 1986. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
J * 
MARK Aj. WOLFERT 
Attorneys for Plain/tiff 
1600 West 2200 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 26786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84126-0786 
y 
Plaintiff's address: 
3226 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
- 6 -
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Salt Lake C i ty . Utah 
DEC 2 9 1986 
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
H. Dixon Hindjey. Clerk 3id Oist. Court 
By K- O^mbnas? 
D<»OII* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS, 
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICK-
GMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF 
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI, 
LISA KTT.T.OUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT 
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC 
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL 
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and 
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and 
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST 
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG, 
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY 
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM, 
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and 
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS, 
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN, 
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER, 
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG 
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR., 
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF 
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and 
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON 
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE 
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS 
dba AUTO MART, and JOHN and 
JANE DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
pEPOSIT OF BOND AMOUNT 
INTO REGISTRY OF COURT 
AND ORDER 
Civil NO. Cgt-92?£ 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
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Western Surety Company hereby deposits the $20,000 
aggregate annual limit of its bond, which is the subject of this 
action, into the registry of the above-entitled court, and 
requests that the sum deposited be held in an interest-bearing 
account* 
DATED this 2 9 — day of D,s#j»Lr* , 1986. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
JpHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for Western Surety 
Company 
-2-
!l ORDER 
f Western Surety Company, having deposited the $20,000 
' aggregate annual limit of its bond into the registry of the 
court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the deposit of the $20,000 
bond amount by Western Surety Company be held in an interest 
bearing account until further order of this court. 
DATED this 3ff day of {fj/&3buJ[u^"/ 1986. 
BY__TflE^ p«JRT: 
MOPPAT 
irt Judge 
13/86-743.1 
STATS Of ^ A H ) ss 
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COJKTY Of SALT LAKE ) 
i, THE L'NwESSSG^ED. CLEPK C= THF OlSTR'TT 
COUar OF'SMT LAKS CC'JfJTV, UT.*H.\CO "ERjEfc i 
C^ITjFY TH.:\ THE ^NNSXED ~i.£3 . -OK^CWp 1 
A TRUE A?C< FULL. CO^Y c? A?} OMGJN'ftt CQCU-
M»j? OM '•%£ IN MY OFHCS AS cue-* CLERK, j 
VVtT,\tSSj fc"Y HAND r.MD SLM. O? W ^ cdl;r.T 
THiS - M DAY O^  tfJS&YfJiS -.« 4 £ -
H csxe^ihpyiY, CL.;«K xT) . / 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY CLERK 
ROOM A-204 • COURTS BUILDING 
240 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
RNES & FORFEITURES 
JL. 
N? 18847 
&( 19 dJo 
RECEIVED A<—~M Usr*~^ rx^&r 
Jjl*.y-&~CZu ?^->v*iff--fi- c ^ 9 - ?U)/^V> **,, Lt>* y3o (X>o >oJ 
&£jp^ 
CASE NO.. Wr-ms 
H. DIXON HINQUEYy6 
z 
LERK 
JTY 
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J*!** •* B**ltbv«it*>, Bar No. 4 544 
mAMSom, Dornm, BPPBRSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS, 
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICK-
GMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF 
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI, 
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT 
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC 
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL 
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and 
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and 
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST 
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG, 
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY 
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM, 
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and 
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS, 
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN, 
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER, 
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG 
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR., 
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF 
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and 
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON 
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE 
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS 
dba AUTO MART, JOHN and JANE 
DOES 1 through 100, and UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
Nori C£ 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. C86-9295 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
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tO TH8 ABOVK NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the hearing on plaintiff's 
MOTION TO ENJOIN EXECUTION AND DETERMINE PRIORITY TO BOND FUNDS, 
previously scheduled for Friday, the 30th day of January, 1987, 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., has been continued to and will be heard 
on Thursday, the 5th day of February, at 9:30 a.m., and will be 
heard in conjunction with an Order To Show Cause why the 
temporary restraining order issued in this matter should not 
remain in effect. Both matters will be heard before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge, 451 South 200 
East, Third Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
torney for Plaintiff 
-2-
CBRTIPICATB OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be HAND DELIVERED this *7 day of 
"^JOnuar ifcl 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, DT 84101 
., 1987, to the followingt 
^y\^ \ 
\s 
and I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
each of the named party defendants in this action on the o?7 
day of \Jsf\acrLA
 f 1987. ^ 
9/86-743M.17 
oTATc Or UTA^ ) ^ 
COUNTY OF SAL? LAK* ) *Z 
I, THE U ^ - ^ i G N E D . C-L»:< C- TMff 7>*£Tp;«CT 
COURT Of S/'LJT LAX£ COUNTY, LT.M-i. *;U - X ^ ^ Y 
CriRTJr/ T:-i^T|TrS A W S A L D ANO f"Cr"GCi/ i^ ^ 
A TR'Jfc AWU hUU CC*Y Ci : M GJvGIKA'.- COCJ-
«V:2?;T cr«i ^ ;tr w ^v Crf;cE AC SUCH CLCRX. 
W i T ^ S «V| HA*D mO ZJJsLjy? SAID COjJRJ 
<2=* 
f ' ^ / L ^ ^ C EPU TY 
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STATE OF UTAH 
RMAN H. BANGERTER INSURANCE DEPARTMENT HAROLD C. YANCEY 
Gov«mor ^ „ ^ — „^* « . Insurance Commissioner 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Phone: (801) 530-6400 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
January 27, 1987 
Western Surety Company 
101 South Phillips Avenue 
Sioux Falls, SD 57192 
Attention: Joe Patrick Kirby, President 
RE: Our File No. 22101 
Dear Mr. Kirby: 
On January 13, 1987 the above referred to file was opened pursuant 
to a complaint filed with the Department alleging that Western 
Surety has failed to satisfy an existing judgment entered in the 
Third District Court in the State of Utah, Salt Lake County (Civil 
No. C86-7427). The complaint was forwarded to Western Surety 
Company on or about January 16, 1987 and we are awaiting the 
company's response. However, an additional matter has come to the 
attention of the Commissioner which causes this correspondence to 
be forwarded to you. 
The judgment at issue in this matter was entered on December 30, 
1986. It was the understanding of counsel for the plaintiff in 
those proceedings that Western Surety would not voluntarily pay 
the judgment. While we understand that Western Surety has the 
right of appeal, it was also the understanding of plaintiff's 
counsel that Western Surety would not appeal. Accordingly, if 
that is the fact, then Western Surety is obliged to satisfy the 
judgment. 
The Commissioner views this matter with much concern. Because of 
the position taken by Western Surety, through its counsel in Salt 
Lake City, plaintiff has been forced to seek the enforcement and 
satisfaction of the judgment through a massive garnishment of 
Western Surety Company agents doing business in this state. The 
garnishment has been issued to approximately twenty (20) agents 
and will continue until the judgment is satisfied. We have 
received complaints from agents, who were not parties to the 
lawsuit, concerning the garnishment of their trust account funds. 
A-41 
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It is the position of the Commissioner that Western Surety must 
satisfy the judgment and not allow the continued garnishment of 
its agents in this state. We view the matter of the outstanding 
garnishment procedures to be totally xxnnecessairy. Furthermore, 
Utah insureds may be placed in a perilous position under the 
garnishment of funds intended as premium for coverage. 
Under the Utah Insurance Code, Section 31A-2-308(ll), the 
Commissioner may revoke the Certificate of Authority of any 
licensee whose methods and practices he finds would endanger the 
legitimate interest of customers and the public. In light of that 
provision, the conduct of Western Surety in failing to satisfy an 
outstanding judgment would, in the opinion of the Commissioner, 
place the Certificate of Authority of the company in jeopardy in 
this state. The Commissioner cannot find good cause, under these 
facts, for Western Surety to allow a garnishment of its agents, 
which may jeopardize policyholders as well as the legitimate 
interests of the public. Subject to Western Surety's right of 
appeal of the judgment that is currently outstanding, the 
Commissioner demands that Western Surety honor the judgment and 
satisfy it in full. Should the company decide not to appeal the 
judgment and not satisfy it, the Commissioner will file a Notice 
of Hearing and Order to Show Cause and consider all appropriate 
penalties in enforcement of the Insurance Code. 
Your cooperation in attendance to this matter is greatly 
appreciated. The Commissioner expects the written response of 
Western Surety within ten (10) days of receipt of this 
correspondence. 
Sincerely, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU 
Insurance Commissioner 
Kendall R. Surfass 
Market Conduct Staff Counsel 
KRS:lm 
1105L 
A-42 
LAW O F F I C E S 
T!M OALTON OUNN 
OAVIO H EPPERSON 
LOWELL V SMITH 
ROBERT R WALLACE 
PAUL M MATTHEWS 
SCOTT W CHRISTENSEN 
TERRY M PLANT 
CLIFFORD C ROSS 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
T J TSAKALOS 
CURTIS J DRAKE 
ANNE 3WENSEN 
JOHN N aRAiTHWAlTE 
GORDON K JENSEN 
MARK OALTON OUNN 
HJLKSOX, D U X N , E P P E R S O N - & S M I T H 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
© S O CLARK LEAMING OFF ICE CENTER 
ITS SOUTH W E S T T E M P L E 
S A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH a^ioi 
TELEPHONE (SOD 363-7611 
February 6, 1987 
STEWART S STEWART I 8 9 S 
STEWART STEWART & ALEXANOER I d I I 
STEWART ALEXANOER S 3 U 0 G E 1 9 2 3 
STEWART STEWART S CANNON 1 9 3 3 
STEWART CANNON S HANSON 19-43 
HANSON & 3AL0WIN I 9 S O 
HANSON BRANDT SWAOSWORTH 19 7 2 
HANSON WAOSWORTH S RUSSON 1 9 7 3 
HANSON RUSSON HANSON SL OUNN 1 9 7 7 
HANSON R U S S O N & O U N N I 9 S 2 
REX J HANSON 
U Q i M 9 d O > 
STATE OP OTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, OT 84145 
Attn: Harold C. Yancey, Insurance Commissioner 
Kendall R. Surfass 
RE: Bond No. 58161261 - Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart 
Insurance Dept. File No. 22101 
Gentlemen: 
This letter will serve to respond to your correspondence 
of January 27, 1987. We sincerely hope that some of the concerns 
set forth in that letter have been laid to rest by your receipt 
of our letter dated January 28, 1987. We will now expand upon 
the matters discussed in our previous letter and address 
specifically the concerns set forth in your most recent letter. 
As you are now aware, this matter concerns a motor 
vehicle dealer's bond issued to Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart 
on February 4, 1986. During the Fall of 1986, three separate 
lawsuits were filed against the principal and Western Surety 
Company, one of which was filed by George M. and Delia A. Baker. 
With the filing of the third lawsuit, it became apparent that the 
claims might exceed the $20,000 bond limit. Accordingly, Western 
Surety Company began taking steps to file an interpleader action, 
such that all claimants could be heard and have an opportunity to 
participate in any bond distribution. Opon contacting the Motor 
Vehicle Department, we learned that approximately 35 claims had 
been filed against the principal during 1986. Prior to the 
filing of this interpleader action, the Baker's counsel, John 
Parken, was informed of the existence of numerous claims and the 
necessity of an interpleader action. Despite such knowledge, the 
Bakers continued to prosecute their action toward judgment. 
Prior to the entry of judgment in favor of the Bakers, 
and prior to any hearing on the matter, Western Surety Company 
filed its complaint for interpleader, naming approximately 35 
A-43 
Mr. Harold Yancey 
Mr. Kendall Surfass 
State of Otah Insurance Dept. 
February 6, 1987 
Page 2 
claimants. The 35 named claimants were those who had filed a 
claim with the Department of Motor Vehicles as required by law. 
These 35 claimants included George and Delia Baker, along with 
the other two claimants that had previously filed suit. 
Prior to the hearing on the Bakerfs motion for summary 
judgment, Western Surety filed a motion to stay the proceedings 
based upon the filing of the interpleader and the inclusion of 
the Bakers in that action. The motion to stay proceedings was 
denied and the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment was granted. 
At that pointf Western Surety believed that the judgment entered 
would be satisfied within the interpleader action against the 
bond funds held under the interpleader jurisdiction. It became 
apparent, however, that the Bakers did not wish to enter the 
interpleader action to satisfy their judgment, but instead 
desired to execute upon that judgment separate and apart from the 
interpleader and the bond funds, in an effort to recover the 
entirety of their judgment in the amount of $15,800.14. 
In mid-January, the Bakers attempted to satisfy their 
judgment by instituting garnishment proceedings and serving 
numerous agents throughout the state with writs of garnishment. 
At this pointf it became necessary to obtain an order temporarily 
restraining such execution, pending a ruling by the judge in the 
interpleader action concerning such garnishment procedures. This 
hearing was held on February 5, 1987. At this hearing, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Third District Court Judge, ruled 
that he could not restrain execution upon the judgment outside of 
the interpleader action because of his limited jurisdiction, 
which, by his ruling, is over the interpleader action only and 
the $20,000 bond amount deposited therein. Judge Moffat 
indicated that execution outside of the interpleader action must 
be limited or otherwise ruled upon by the judge handling the 
matter in the Baker action. 
The problem that has developed at this point is that the 
Bakers have obtained a judgment against the bond and apparently 
feel that, by reason of the judgment, they have priority to the 
$20,000. The interpleader action was filed before such judgment 
was obtained, however. Western Surety Company does not dispute 
the fact that the Bakers are entitled to participate in the 
interpleader action and receive whatever monies they are entitled 
to therein. It is simply the position of Western Surety that 
satisfaction of the judgment must be within the interpleader 
action, out of the bond funds that are the subject of that 
action. 
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With the above described posture of this matter, it is 
apparent that a ruling must be made at some point limiting 
execution upon the Bakers1 judgment to the interpleaded bond 
funds. Perhaps the isolated summary judgment granted in favor of 
the Bakers should not have been considered with the interpleader 
already established. Accordingly, Western Surety Company has 
appealed the denial of its motion to stay proceedings. It should 
be noted at this point that it has never been represented to 
plaintiffs1 counsel that Western Surety would not appeal. 
Rather, representations were simply made that Western Surety 
Company would not appeal plaintiffs' claim on the merits. 
Plaintiffs' claim is not being disputed on the merits. It is 
merely Western Surety Company's position with this appeal that 
plaintiffs* claim should have been considered within the 
interpleader action and satisfied therein, rather than considered 
in isolation. If the plaintiffs' claim had been considered in 
the interpleader action, the attempts to satisfy the judgment 
outside of the interpleader action would not occur. 
With the appeal of the denial of Western Surety 
Company's motion to stay proceedings pendingf execution upon the 
judgment subsequently rendered will be stayed pending the appeal. 
It remains Western Surety Company's positionr however, that the 
Bakers may participate in the interpleader action and satisfy 
their judgment therein despite the pendency of the appeal. 
Western Surety Company is not unwilling to satisfy the judgment 
entered against it and the plaintiffs have not been forced to 
seek the enforcement and satisfaction of their judgment through 
garnishment proceedings. The plaintiffs have full right and are 
entitled to satisfy their judgment within the interpleader 
action. The plaintiffs are not entitledf however, to satisfy 
that judgment outside of the interpleader actionf as such would 
place a risk of double liability upon Western Surety Company 
because the $20,000 bond amount is held by the Court and under 
the interpleader court's jurisdiction. 
It is truly unfortunate that this matter has come to 
rest in its current posture. It has not been Western Surety's 
intent to delay or hinder the Bakers in seeking satisfaction of 
their judgment. Rather, Western Surety has admitted its 
liability on the $20,000 bond and tendered the same into the 
Court with interpleader jurisdiction. Satisfaction of judgments 
obtained following the filing of that interpleader must be made 
within the interpleader action. 
We hope that this letter will provide you with the 
information necessary to understand the posture of these claims. 
Mr^ Harolcj Yancey 
Mr. Kendall Surfass 
State of Utah Insurance Dept. 
February 6, 1987 
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If you have any questions or concerns at all about this matter, 
please feel free to contact the undersigned counsel for Western 
Surety Company• 
Very truly yoursf 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
i 
^JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorneys for Western Surety Co. 
JNB/dn 
cc: Kevin Bonnett 
Western Surety Company 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ORMAN H. BANGERTER INSURANCE DEPARTMENT HAROLD C. YANCEY 
Governor Insurance Commissioner 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Phone: (801)530-6400 
February 12, 1987 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
115 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attention: John N. Braithwaite 
RE: Our File No. 22101 
Dear Mr. Braithwaite: 
I am in receipt of your February 6, 1987 hand-delivered letter in 
response to the Baker complaint. We agree that it is truly 
unfortunate that this matter has come to rest in its current 
posture. We also believe that it is not Western Surety's intent 
to delay or hinder the Bakers in seeking satisfaction of the 
judgment, but further understand that Western Surety would resolve 
the matter through the interpleader jurisdiction. We note that 
you have appealed the Judge's decision to refuse the stay of the 
summary judgment proceedings. It is my understanding that an 
appropriate bond should be filed in connection with that appeal to 
stay the execution of the Baker judgment. To that end, we would 
appreciate verification that the appropriate bond has been filed 
so that further collection by garnishment of Western Surety agents 
in this state can be discontinued in light of the appellate 
posture of the case. 
If you have any questions concerning this correspondence please do 
not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU 
Insurance Commissioner 
Kendall R. Surfass^/ 
Market Conduct Staff Counsel 
KRS:lm 
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liability when we hau ixled the Interpleader Actn;ii;i which 
^ j was speci fical 1 y to take care of that. I believe that the 
3
 Appeal can be completely unnecessary;. If we were to limit 
4
 the Bakers to the satisfaction of thei t, Judgment as they 
5 are entit *-Q recover against the 3ond Funds. 
6
 Your Honor, in the previous hearing on December 
- | 19th I rid i cated that j oi i wer e i lot ruling on priority, that 
8 that was not before you. We didn't know that the Bakers 
9 simply because they obtained a Judgment fii 
10 entitled to priority* We still don't know that one 
11 has ruled on that , There's no tit ih case on point - I 
12 submit, Your Honor, that Interpleader iias properly filed in 
13 I ter and that the Bakers have a Summary Judgment 
14 against Western Surety. But Western Surety's liability is 
15 limited to the ?;;inl(fH)rt Bond V\A\A -nu.l u' this time T 
16 believe something needs to be done with that* Either an 
17 Order needs to be done limiting execution to their 
18 involvement i n the In terpleader Actioh or the Order that 
19 was entered needs to be revised to explicitly set forth 
20 what was intended to be entered. 
21 i - I wo ii J, a stiijiim, it on that ba&is, Your Honor. 
22 I THE COURT: First of all let me state this. In 
23 | reading your memorandums I was concerned Miat I rli'T.11 pven 
24 I know i r r fiaw-> -Jurisdiction in this matter but, L am going 
25 j to rule and I still think there's a serious question. I 
19 
know there's a serious question and whether I have 
jurisdiction with that Appeal up there, of course they can 
grant me the right to make it, but I think right now the 
case is really in their hands. So, I think there's a very 
serious question there, 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: May I make one comment, Your 
Honor, A phone call yesterday afternoon to the Supreme 
Court indicated that this was not docketed yet. 
THE COURT: That might be. I don't want to get on 
that. All I know what you said in your memorandum, you 
said it's on appeal to the Supreme Court. 
MR. PARKEN: I want the record to be absolutely 
clear on that point, Your Honor. I think it's 
jurisdictional. The Utah Supreme Court's records, and I 
checked with them this morning, indicate that Mr. 
Braithwaite's appeal in this case was docketed in the Utah 
Supreme Court on February 11th under Case No. 870059. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, there you are. 
MR. BRAITHWAITE. I don't think that takes 
jurisdiction away from Rule 60(b), Your honor, that's only 
in Rule 60(a). 
THE COURT: Well, this may be another matter 
you're to be contesting, I don't know, but I have a serious 
— very serious question, I'll restate it, whether I have 
jurisdiction. 
20 
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1
 I Now, going back to the first situation of; when 
2 . '. • --:;... me of course on the Summary Judgment, and I 
3 icr remember exactly what was presented to me at that 
4
 time w remember ymn beinq in hen* and t do remember 
5 ::r-. h* judgment,, 1 don't remember specifically 
6 whether you said, and I'm not saying you didn't, whether 
7 you said - I lu» interpleader action had been 
« I * : : < * * 7 remember some statement being made that the 
* oonding company wasn't sufficiently Satisfied that they had 
10 | liability «it that' point. Something to that effect. 
ti Now, other than that r»t remember much about 
12 ~ * ^as one of the tn •. 
13 I entitled to proceed with their case. If the 
14 Interpleader Action had been perfected in al ] probabili*- I 
15 would have granted .i «ir,;.iy tiiere I ilon't know. I maybe 
16 wanted to look the law on it:, 
17 MR. BRAITHWAITE: If Your Honor would review I hie 
18 memor « v)tinn i think you will see that 
19 it was —• 
20 THE COURT: I know what y o u ' r e say I ruj - I m say ing 
21 
23 
25 
tiriciti i :II,,J "ni'i.ini" the Summary Judgment because of the fact 
22 that they were there. They were befote the Court. They 
had come r~ - aad the i r act 11 mi f i I *jd
 f pet fected and 
->* Interpleader Action had been filed, which 
I don1!; remember if I knew or didn't Hnow that it was 
2 1 
certainly filed just for the purpose of granting the stay 
and still the bonding company was questioning whether they 
had liability in this situation. But I am of the opinion, 
and I would so rule, that the judgment awarded to the 
plaintiff against Western Surety would only go to against 
the bond. Western Surety is not liable for more money than 
what they have contracted to pay out and that's the bond 
amount. When they paid this into Court under Interpleader 
Action, of course that's what you're on the Supreme Court, 
whether the plaintiff can — are entitled to that money 
first since they've got their judgment and whether they 
have to go into the Interpleader Action and get their 
money. 
It's my opinion that a Judge Moffitt had 
jurisdiction to grant a stay in that action since that 
money was then paid into the Court and the Interpleader 
action filed with that Court. Course he thought other-
wise. Who has the jurisdiction to grant that stay is a 
question. But I am saying that I definitely, and I'm 
ruling, that the plaintiff is only entitled to release 
against the bond. And whether they can get in and get the 
money first or whether it has to go through the 
Interpleader Action, the Supreme Court kicks it back here, 
I guess we'll have to look at it again if they want to rule 
on it, then I guess they'll make the decision. 
22 
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MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Arid as r say, maybe this whole Ruling 
of mi ne is mute because they have jurisdiction. But I am 
stating that position. 
MR. PARKEN: wondering if the Court wants to 
specify so as to avoid objections to the Order under what 
Rule Court: is amending its earlier judgment t-n I imir, as 
r- to the bond. 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Is the Court amending its prior 
order or entering a new order? 
THE COURT: Well ~ ruling - I donft know what 
you •-- T haven't read your judgment • If your judgment just 
says a blanket judgm^n* aqa tns1' Western Surety then I think 
-hat's incorrect. I think you're entitled to Judgment 
against the amount of the bond of Western Surety or the 
bond i tsel f. A i id whether this is — of course you're to 
state the alteration I guess there's a 10-day situation 
there, but 1 think the judgment itself i,s voidr dud 1 think 
under Ru J *? —-
MR. BRAITHWAITE: 60(b). 
THE COURT: Tn vn id judgment. i" think the 
judgment, itself i s void. 
MR PARKEN: That's the basis of your ru. 
THE COURT: if rh.it1 s nie way 11: '• s worded, 
haven't read your judgment I'm saying that my judgment 
23 
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would only go against Western Surety against the bond. And 
I don't know how your judgment reads. 
MR. PARKEN: And the order should reflect that 
that's pursuant to Rule 60(b)? 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't checked it. Is that 
right, counsel? I know judgment — 60(b) says if a 
judgment is void, isn't that the one? 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: 60(b) sub 5 refers to judgments 
that are void. 60(b) sub 1 refers to mistakes, 
inadvertence, excusable neglect. 
THE COURT: I think it's really both. If you've 
got it worded such that it's against them I think it's a 
mistake. I think it's a void judgment. 
MR. PARKEN: Okay. 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(THEREUPON, the Motion was 
concluded.) 
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UNITED STATE OF AMERICA 
State of Utah 
ss. 
County of Salt 1 alee 
I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of tHe State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of ttye judgmuU luiuluiml 
Stipulation and Motion for Dismissal of Appeal, Order of Dismissal 
and copy of the Supreme Court Remittitur |m Case No. B'/UUby. 
in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in My office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I h t^ve hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this 
the TWENTIETH 
OCTOBER
 A ^  87 day of A.D. 19 
GEOFFREY J. BUTLER 
Clerk, Supreme Court 
John N. Braithwaiter Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Templef Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
FILED 
MAR 2 61987 
C|e*> Supreme Court, tf ah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents , 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL 
Case No. 870059 
District Court 
Civil No. C86-7427 
Defendant and appellant, Western Surety Company, by and 
through its counsel, John N. Braithwaite, and plaintiffs and 
respondents, George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker, by and through 
their counsel, John D. Parken, hereby stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. The above captioned appeal, referenced by Case No. 
870059, may be dismissed. 
Each party shall bear its: owi i c<: :»st :s ai i< 3 attorney 1 s 
.,is appeal. 
7/, /Z/ttszLx/jL 
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
IANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Western Surety Company 
Date MareJ, 2 3 / f ? 7 
for Ylaintiffs/Respondents 
M. Baker and Delia A. Baker 
»at« <H3M**&{ 
MOTION 
Based upon the foregoing stipulation, 
defendant/appellant Western Suiet.y t'ompdiiy, by .HKI through its 
counsel, John N. Braithwaite, respectfully moves this Court for 
an order dismissing this appeal. 
DATED this 2^-^- day of March r 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Western Surety Company 
1/86-600D.33 
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No, 870059 
District Court 
Civil No. C86-7427 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and the motion 
of the appellant Western Surety Company for the dismissal of this 
appeal, and pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-referenced appeal is 
dismissed. .-*-/•? 
day of March, 1987. 
BY THE SUPREME COURT: 
DATED this f?t? 
/fSSfc 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a I i m-> ,nv1 "uitoct copy 
of ie mailed, postage prepaid, this s^*-1 
day of fibret\ ., 1987, to the following: 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
1/86-7 4 m. 
??• ^Cu£%**>//£ 
_ o _ 
IM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—00OO00-
Regular February Term, 1987 March 26, 1987 
George M. Baker and 
Delia A. Baker, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
Western Surety Company; 
Craig A. Papa-Dakls, 
individually and dba 
"Auto-Mart"; and Auto-Mart 
and Unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants and Appellant 
REMITTITUR 
No. 8 70059 
District Wo. C86 
Stipulation to dismiss, having been considered, it 
ordered that the same be, and hereby is, granted. 
Issued: March 31, 1987 
Record: None 
SYNOPSIS OF FIDELITY & DEPOSIT £0. OF MP. 
v. SANTA MONICA FIN, CO., t. Ca I . Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) 
In this case, a surety had issued $ $5,000 > • to a 
motor vehicle dealer,
 f u . ; und became thejsubject ,i multiple 
claims exceeding the bond penalty. Prior ti the filing of the 
interpleader in that case, one of tiif» <:.l jimani K filed an 
independent act. iun against the surety and the dealer. Upon 
application of the surety, an injunction wag entered, ei m g 
the claimant from, further prosecuting its action. In affirming 
-!e granting of the injunction, -he appellate court cited an 
earlier case and stated: 
"The very purpose of this action wa$ to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits and to ascertain and 
equitably distribute the available bond fund 
among those who are entitled to share therein. 
The proportions and extent to which each is 
entitled to participate in that fund, subject 
to the maximum liability prescribed by the 
bond, is measured by the proportionate loss 
sustained by each on account of the 
derelictions of the broker.w [Citations 
omitted] In aid of such jurisdiction, an 
injunction against the prosecution cj>f other 
actions, pending the determination of the 
rights of the various claimants, may properly 
be granted by the court in the exercise of its 
discretion. 
Id. at 2 17, 
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